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THE COMMANDEERER IN CHIEF
Jason Mazzone*
As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, federalism can impede the govern-
ment's ability to plan for and respond to emergencies. Many emergencies tran-
scend federalist divisions of power and responsibility, rendering unclear which
level of government should respond. In addition, while emergencies may
require a coordinated response by local, state, and national government, getting
different levels of government to work together in times of crises is difficult.
Further, even when states and localities call for outside assistance, they tend to
resist undue federal interference in their affairs; a national government that
lacks experience working with local actors on the ground can find it difficult to
implement relief programs. Given the widely recognized failures of the govern-
ment's response to Katrina and the urgent need for reform, some federal officials
have proposed that, in a future emergency, rather than try to work with state
and local response personnel, the federal government should simply deploy the
military to take over the relief effort. This Article presents an alternative solu-
tion: emergency commandeering. This solution would allow the federal govern-
ment, when it responds to certain kinds of emergencies, to call into periods of
mandatory federal service the emergency response personnel of the state in which
the emergency occurs, and, if necessary, emergency response personnelfrom other
states. These state employees--police, firefighters, emergency medical techni-
cians, urban search and rescue teams, and public health specialists-would
serve with compensation under the command of the President. Emergency com-
mandeering allows the national government to mount an effective response, one
that draws upon the skills and experiences of state and local personnel, without
the hindrance of multiple command structures or other forms of state and local
resistance. Emergency commandeering is authorized by the Constitution, con-
sistent with federalism, and, compared to the alternative of sending the military
into our streets, good for democracy.
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purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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Emergencies challenge federalism. For one thing, emergencies
do not abide by the "distinction" that "the Constitution requires ...
between what is truly national and what is truly local."2 Rather than
correspond neatly to the particular divisions of government the system
has devised, emergencies traverse geographic and political boundaries
and demand responses from administrative units that (aside from
being affected by the same incident) might have little in common.
Hurricanes and their aftermath are rarely confined to a single town or
a single state; earthquakes ignore state lines; contaminated food can
produce simultaneous public health crises in New York City, Chicago,
and San Francisco. Even when emergencies do arise in distinct loca-
tions, they often have broader regional or national effects. Thus,
while the airplanes hijacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001,
struck three specific sites (Manhattan, Washington, D.C., and Somer-
set County, Pennsylvania), the effects of those attacks-political, eco-
nomic, and social-radiated throughout the country.
In addition, when an emergency transcends the preexisting struc-
tural divisions of political authority, it can be unclear just who is sup-
posed to respond. If, for example, an airplane from Boston's Logan
Airport hits an office building in Manhattan, are New York City offi-
cials responsible for organizing the response effort because they are
closest to the scene? Or does responsibility fall on state government
(which might have greater resources), or on the federal government
(because an aviation incident is a national concern)? If travelers from
Asia bring avian flu to Southern California, are local officials responsi-
ble for organizing inoculations and quarantine because health is the
business of local government? Or should federal officials take charge
because if the disease is not contained, it will produce a national cri-
sis? A nuclear weapon might be smuggled to the United States by sea:
who should be responsible for checking cargo containers that arrive
in Newark en route to Des Moines? In the absence of some corrective
mechanism, federalism can easily produce a failure of government.
Unless issues of authority and responsibility are resolved well in
1 CICERO, DE OFFIcIIS 78 (Walter Miller trans., MacMillan Co. 1921) (literally
translating to "[l]et arms yield to the toga" and more loosely "[1]et military power give
way to civilian authority").
2 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)).
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advance, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that no level of govern-
ment will prepare sufficiently for or respond satisfactorily to an emer-
gency when it does occur. When responsibility is dispersed, the
overall response can easily prove inadequate.
Further, in many emergencies an effective response requires the
contributions of officials from multiple levels of government-local,
state, and national-as well as the use of resources from multiple gov-
ernmental units. 3 Here, too, federalism presents obstacles. Where
responsibility for mounting the response is or can be divided up
among multiple power holders, the effectiveness of the response often
depends upon the ability of these power holders to cooperate, or at
least to coordinate their actions. This might be beyond the system's
capacities. Federalism does not necessarily include built-in mecha-
nisms for suspending the normal independent operations of the
existing divisions of governmental authority and getting the parts of
the system to work together as one. Dilemmas of collective action can
easily thwart an adequate emergency response: officials at one level of
government might refuse to provide assistance beyond what they per-
ceive to be in their own immediate interest or they might refuse to
cede control over their own resources. Even if a powerful coordina-
tor-for instance the national government-has the necessary will to
force coordination-its efforts, particularly if made in the heat of the
moment-might be undermined by resistance and incompetence on
the ground.
4
Finally, federalism also risks a long-term pathology because the
experience with failure might not readily lead to learning and imple-
menting necessary reforms. In a centralized system of government,
responsibility for responding to emergencies is clear: it lies, ultimately,
with the officials who occupy the center. Perhaps the central govern-
ment will not respond adequately (it might lack sufficient personnel
and resources, the necessary organizational skills, or simply the incli-
nation). But if there is a failure of governmental response, the blame,
by definition, rests at the center. By contrast, in a federal system of
government, where authority and responsibility are divided up and
dispersed, blame is not so easily assigned. As a formal matter, it may
3 See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism,
30J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201-04 (2002) (discussing the roles of multiple levels of
government in responding to bioterrorism).
4 See Audio tape: Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go From Here? (Sept. 8,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/2005
0908.pdf) (noting that "our response as a nation is highly interdependent" and "if
one layer of government or one agency within one layer of government gets [things]
catastrophically wrong, the entire response will be handicapped as a result of that").
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be uncertain which level of government (national, state, or local)
bears responsibility for responding to any particular kind of emer-
gency: the U.S. Constitution says nothing, for example, about hurri-
canes. Even if one level of government assumes responsibility and
mounts a response, resulting deficiencies might be attributed to inter-
ference by or the shortcomings of another level of government. State
government can say that it didn't know the crisis was coming because
the federal government had information it didn't share; that the fed-
eral government didn't come through with anticipated resources and
assistance; and that when the state itself tried to act, federal bureau-
crats got in the way. The federal government can claim that it stood
ready but nobody asked for its help, and out of respect for state sover-
eignty it was not more proactive; that when the requests did come,
they were too late; and that when federal officials went to the scene to
provide assistance, state officials, guarding their turf, undermined the
response. Each government can assert that it did what was required of
it and that the response would have succeeded but for the inadequa-
cies of somebody else. In sum, federalism can fail to produce an ade-
quate response to particular emergencies-and, even worse, by
clouding assessments of fault, never manage to correct its past
inadequacies.
Hurricane Katrina, causing massive destruction in Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, and Alabama in August 2005, vividly illustrated these weak-
nesses of federalism during times of emergency. Katrina's impact was
not confined to the Gulf Coast states. New Orleans, home to
thousands of residents and businesses affected directly by the hurri-
cane, is also one of the nation's largest ports and a center for oil and
gas production and delivery.5 Katrina therefore drove up energy
prices around the nation. 6 Katrina also quickly became the concern
of other states when displaced residents from affected communities
sought refuge further north. 7 These consequences are not surprising:
major damage to any modern American city will inevitably have
national effects. Yet despite ample warning about Katrina's arrival
and likely impact, no government-national, state, or local-ade-
quately prepared vulnerable communities and their populations.
After Katrina struck, the governmental response remained sluggish
5 Port of New Orleans-Lousiana, USA, http://www.portno.com/pno-pages/
about overview.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
6 SeeJad Mouawad, Now in the Rearview Mirror: Low Gasoline Prices, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2006, at C1.
7 See, e.g., Peter Grier, The Great Katrina Migration, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
12, 2005, at 1, 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0912/pOlsOl-ussc.
html.
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and disorganized. "Katrina was a national failure," reported the
House Select Committee charged with investigating the governmental
performance, adding that the failure represented "an abdication of
the most solemn obligation to provide for the common welfare."8
Even with all of its post-9/11 emergency planning and preparation,
the nation seemed paralyzed to respond with any degree of efficiency
to a predictable disaster at home.
Federalism has rightly received a good part of the blame for the
deficient response to Katrina.9 Even after Katrina had destroyed large
swaths of the Gulf States and had overwhelmed state and local
response capacities, federalism concerns prevented the national gov-
ernment from taking charge of the response. Speaking on August 31,
2005, two days after Katrina had made landfall, and with much of New
Orleans under water, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff
explained: " [W] e come to assist local and state authorities. Under the
Constitution, state and local authorities have the principal first line of
response obligation .... [T]he federal government does not super-
sede the state and local government."10 Indeed, state and local offi-
cials, though desperate for assistance, actively resisted federal
overreaching. In the days after Katrina, President George W. Bush
asked Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco to place the state's
National Guard under the control of federal officials so they could
8 SELECr BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR & RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at x (2006)
[hereinafter FAILURE OF INITIATIVE], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/
creports/katrina.html.
9 See David S. Broder, The Right Minds for Recovery, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2005, at
A23 ("The failure to respond to [Katrina] exposed one of the few real structural weak-
nesses in our Constitution: a mechanism to coordinate the work of local, state and
national governments."); Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path From Hurricane to
Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 11, 2005, at Al ("The fractured division of responsibility...
meant no one person was in charge .... The power-sharing arrangement ...
prove [d] disastrous."); Erin Ryan, Federalism, Subsidiarity, & the Tug of War Within:
How the New Federalism Failed Katrina Victims & What We Can Learn 13, 47 (Apr. 4,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (concluding that the failure of
"the United States government [to] properly protect, feed, and evacuate its own...
came down to the vehemence with which federal leadership hewed to their principled
reading of the constitutional balance of powers between the state and national gov-
ernments"). But see Richard A. Posner, Our Incompetent Government, NEW REPUBLIC,
Nov. 14, 2005, at 23, 25 (suggesting that federalism was not to blame, but the failure
to adhere to "principles of federalism [that] teach that government responsibilities
should be pushed down to the lowest level at which they can be performed effec-
tively-but not lower," such that disasters exceeding capacities of state and local gov-
ernments are a federal responsibility).
10 CNN REPORTS, KATRINA: STATE OF EMERGENCY 46 (2005).
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coordinate the overall response.11 Concerned with yielding control
over state resources, the Governor refused the request. 12 As a result,
federal and state personnel mounted independent responses to the
hurricane's aftermath, working without the benefits of a single com-
mand structure. While people perished in New Orleans and other
towns, governmental officials argued about who was in charge.13
Katrina also amply demonstrated how federalism provides cover for
errors: beginning almost immediately after Katrina struck, local, state,
and federal officials all criticized each other for the failure to prepare
and respond.
14
Reflecting on the failures during Katrina, one commentator says:
"We need to 'stop federalism' before it kills again."' 5 Yet fixing feder-
11 Michelle Millhollon & Mark Ballard, Blanco Coolly Greets Bush; Friction Between
State, Federal Government Shows in Visit, ADvoc. (Baton Rouge), Sept. 6, 2005, at IA.
New Orleans officials reportedly supported the proposal. On September 1, Mayor
Ray Nagin met with President Bush and reportedly demanded: "We just need to cut
through this and do what it takes to have a more controlled command structure. If
that means federalizing it, let's do it." Evan Thomas, How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 26, 40 (reporting on an interview with Senator David Vitter); see also
DOUGLAS G. BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE 562-71 (2006) (describing interactions
between the White House and the governor with respect to this proposal). Some
reports suggest that the White House proposal extended to police forces. See
Nicholas Lemann, Insurrection, NEW YORKER, Sept. 26, 2005, at 67, 67 ("[T]he Admin-
istration tried to persuade the governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Blanco, to issue an
official request that the federal government take control of the Louisiana National
Guard and the New Orleans police.").
12 See Karen Tumulty et al., 4 Places Where the System Broke Down, TIME, Sept. 19,
2005, at 34, 38.
13 See, e.g., Lipton et al., supra note 9 ("[T]he crisis in New Orleans deepened
because of a virtual standoff between federal officials and besieged authorities in Lou-
isiana."); Eric Lipton et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2005, at Al ("Interviews with officials in Washington and Louisiana show that as the
situation grew worse, they were wrangling with questions of federal/state authority.").
14 See Susan B. Glasser & Josh White, Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH.
POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al (reporting statement by a Louisiana official that "funda-
mentally the first breakdown occurred at the local level"); Scott Shane et al., After
Failures, Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at Al (reporting com-
plaints by New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin that "[a] bunch of people are the boss" and
"[t]he state and federal government are doing a two-step dance"); Jim VandeHei,
Officials Deal with Political Fallout by Pointing Fingers, WASH. POST., Sept. 5, 2005, at Al 7
(reporting that "Bush administration officials . . .questioned local efforts to rescue
thousands of people who were stranded for days without food, water and shelter"
while "Louisiana officials pushed back against the White House ... for offering a
tentative and insufficient response ... and then trying to shift the blame to the state
and local governments").
15 Stephen M. Griffin, Stop Federalism Before it Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane
Katrina, 21 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 527, 538 (2007).
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alism, putting in place institutional structures to deal adequately with
emergencies, is not easy.' 6 When emergencies are of a kind and a
degree that they overwhelm localities and states, an effective response
requires the assistance of the national government. However, the
national government itself will be ineffective if it cannot quickly and
efficiently coordinate and work with state and local personnel. This is
because the employees of state and local governments vastly outnum-
ber federal civil personnel, and state and local personnel are the ones
in the immediate vicinity of an emergency when it occurs. Therefore,
even if federal officials take charge of the response, they necessarily
depend upon state and local personnel to implement the response on
the ground.1 7 Required, then, is a mechanism to ensure that when
federal officials take over an emergency response, their program is
effectuated at the state and local level. However, federalism does not
itself provide any such mechanism. Indeed, federalism actively resists
seamless implementation of federal programs by state and local
governments.
In the wake of Katrina, some federal officials proposed their own
dramatic solution to the problems federalism presents in times of
emergency: during an emergency, the federal government will bypass
civilian workers entirely and deploy the national military in their
place.18 This proposal had an obvious appeal. 19 It would end federal
16 The House Select Committee on Katrina, while identifying numerous instances
in which government might perform better in the future, found no "simple answer to
improving state and federal integration [in times of emergency]." FAILURE OF INITIA-
TIVE, supra note 8, at 223. Federalism, after all, could not simply be abandoned.
"Local control and state sovereignty are important principles rooted in the nation's
birth," the Committee explained, and these principles "cannot be discarded merely to
achieve more efficient ... operations on American soil." Id.
17 In 2000 (the most recent year for which firm data exists) there were 565,915
full-time local police in 12,666 departments in the United States, and 87,028 full-time
state police in forty-nine state departments (Hawaii has no state police). See BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATIS-
TICS-2003, at 42 tbl.1.27 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 31st ed. 2005),
available at http://albany.edu/sourcebook. In addition to state and local police,
there were 3070 sheriffs' offices with 293,823 full-time officers, and 1376 "special juris-
diction" departments with 69,650 employees responsible for policing airports, public
housing, colleges, and the like. Id. By comparison, in 2002, there were 90,168 federal
officers authorized to carry firearms and make arrests. Of these, 19,101 (or 21%)
were immigration agents and 14,305 (15.9%) were assigned to the Bureau of Prisons.
Id. at 69 tbl.1.72.
18 See, e.g., IRWIN REDLENER, AMERICANS AT RISK 160-65 (2006).
19 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 15 ("[T]he call for increasing the
military's role in domestic affairs is easy to grasp. Who else can respond the way the
military can? Who else can stand up when others have fallen?").
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dependence on state and local personnel-by sending, in their place,
federal troops, who know how to take orders from the top, and who
will get the job done.20 The President appeared to consider this possi-
bility during Katrina, 21 subsequently asked Congress to consider the
option,2 2 and soon called on Congress for specific executive authority
to mount a military response to future domestic emergencies. 23 Not
surprisingly, state governors have not favored this approach. 24 For
instance, Governor Jeb Bush of Florida took the view that "federaliz-
ing emergency response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as
bad as Hurricane Katrina." 25 In addition, as many critics have pointed
out, the use of troops in domestic emergencies (currently prohibited
in many circumstances under the Posse Comitatus Act of 187826)
raises new problems.27 While the military could supply the federal
government with the personnel to carry out an effective response, pro-
20 See REDLENER, supra note 18, at 161 (reporting comment by former Secretary
of State Colin L. Powell that "[w] hat you.. . have in the military that is of enormous
use-and does not exist in civilian life-is command and control," making military
forces "uniquely qualified for a major domestic emergency").
21 The President stated in his Jackson Square speech on September 15, 2005:
"[A] challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for
the armed forces." President's Address to the Nation on Hurricane Katrina Recovery
from New Orleans, Lousiana, 4 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1405, 1408 (Sept. 15, 2005).
22 See Jim VandeHei & Josh White, Congress Asked to Consider Placing Pentagon in
Charge of Disaster Response, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2005, at A12 (reporting the Presi-
dent's statement that "a very important consideration for Congress to think about" is
whether "there [is] a natural disaster-of a certain size-that would ... enable the
Defense Department to become the lead agency in coordinating and leading the
response effort").
23 Eric Schmitt & Thomas Shanker, Military May Propose an Active-Duty Force for
Relief Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A15; Chris Strohm, Officials Consider Quicker
Federalization, Use of Militay in Disaster Response, GOVERNMENT EXECuTIVE.COM, Sept. 20,
2005, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0905/092005cl.htm. The President also
suggested that in the event of an influenza pandemic he would deploy the military to
enforce quarantines. See CNN Live at Daybreak (CNN television broadcast Oct. 5,
2005) (transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0510/05/
lad.03.html) (quoting President George W. Bush noting that to enforce a quarantine
"[o]ne option is the use of a military that's able to plan and move" and that he had
put that option "on the table").
24 See Press Release, Nat'l Governors Ass'n, NGA Statement on Federalizing
Emergencies (Oct. 13, 2005), available at http://www.nga.org (follow "News Room"
hyperlink; then follow "News Release Archive" hyperlink; then follow "NGA State-
ment on Federalizing Emergencies" hyperlink under "10/13/2005") ("Governors are
responsible for the safety and welfare of their citizens and are in the best position to
coordinate all resources to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters.").
25 Jeb Bush, Op-Ed., Think Locally on Relief, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A19.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000); see infra Part I.B.1.
27 See infra note 28.
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fessional soldiers-armed and ready for warfare-might produce
order at the price of liberty.
28
In light of these various considerations, Congress adopted a com-
promise measure. 29 In October 2006, as part of a military appropria-
tions bill, Congress authorized the President to deploy military forces,
including National Guard units under federal command, to states and
localities following a natural disaster or other emergency. 30 However,
the President's authority is limited to deploying troops in order to
implement law and order when state government is unable to main-
tain control such that federal rights are put in jeopardy or there is
opposition to the enforcement of federal laws. 31 Although limiting
military intervention to instances where federal interests are at risk,
the statute enhances executive powers in times of emergency. It
remains to be seen, in a future emergency, how these new powers will
be used and the results of deploying the military to restore order.
This Article offers an alternative solution to the problems of fed-
eralism in times of emergency, a solution based on largely forgotten
provisions of the Constitution that were used regularly in the early
history of the nation. The solution is to allow the national govern-
ment, when it responds to certain kinds of emergencies, to call into
periods of mandatory federal service the emergency response person-
nel of the state in which the emergency occurs and, where necessary,
emergency response personnel from other states. During emergen-
cies, these state employees-police, firefighters, emergency medical
technicians, urban search and rescue teams, and public health special-
ists-would serve with compensation under the command of the Pres-
28 See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Coup de Grdce, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 2005, at 10,
10 ("[Elliminating the ... [restrictions under the Posse Comitatus Act] would lead to
abuses as the active-duty military begins supplementing civilian police."); Charles J.
Dunlap Jr., Putting Troops on the Beat, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2006, at A17 ("Midnight
searches by well-armed troops might fly in Baghdad . .. but certainly not in Balti-
more."); Mark Sappenfield, Battle Brews over a Bigger Military Role, CHRISTIAN SC. MONI-
TOR, Dec. 13, 2005, at 3, 3 ("[T]he mere mention of the Defense Department taking a
leading role in disaster response is enough to send governors and civil libertarians
scurrying for tar and feathers.").
29 All fifty governors opposed the change. See Letter from the Nat'l Governors
Ass'n to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Harry Reid, Minority Leader, U.S.
Senate, & Dennis Hastert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 1, 2006) (on
file with author), available at http://www.nga.org (click "Letters" hyperlink under
"Federal Relations"; then follow "August 6, 2006" hyperlink).
30 SeeJohn Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub.
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ident, as Commander in Chief. With the power to place in federal
service these state and local personnel, the federal government would
be able to direct the response effort without being stymied by the
vagaries of state and local bureaucracies. Once the emergency was
over, the basis for calling into service the state and local personnel
would evaporate, and they would return to their regularjobs with state
and local governments.
During Katrina, then, the President would have been able to fed-
eralize police officers, firefighters, search and rescue workers, hazard-
ous waste crews, and other emergency personnel in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama. There would have been no need for the
governors of those states or for local officials to consent to federaliza-
tion: the order would have issued directly to the chiefs of police, fire,
and other departments. In addition to federalizing the personnel
within an affected state, the national government would also have
been entitled to deploy to New Orleans and other towns law enforce-
ment and emergency response personnel from other states. Again,
the order would have issued directly to the police department in
Arkansas, the leader of the search and rescue team in Texas, and so
on.
To modern ears, and from a federalism perspective, my proposal
might seem extraordinary-crazy, even. But it is, I argue in this Arti-
cle, a reasonable solution to the problems federalism presents in times
of emergency. Moreover, my proposal is in harmony with principles
of federalism-more so than deploying federal troops to displace the
civil personnel of states and localities. For constitutional lawyers, the
obvious specific objection to my proposal is that it is a form of uncon-
stitutional commandeering: the Supreme Court of the United States
has ruled that under the Tenth Amendment, the federal government
may not commandeer state legislatures32 or executive personnel. 33
However, the anticommandeering objection is misplaced. Justice Ste-
vens had it right, I contend, when, in his dissent in the Printz case
(decided in 1997), he argued that even if a ban on commandeering
invalidated the federal statute at issue in the case-a statute requiring
local sheriffs to perform firearms background checks-the ban should
not apply, or not apply equally, in times of emergency. Stevens stated:
32 SeeNewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (invalidating provisions
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act because the Constitution
prohibits Congress from commandeering state legislatures).
33 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (invalidating provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because the Constitution prohibits Con-
gress from commandeering state executive officials to enforce federal law).
[VOL. 83:1
THE COMMANDEERER IN CHIEF
Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administra-
tion of a military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall
an epidemic, or .. .the threat of an international terrorist, may
require a national response before federal personnel can be made
available to respond. If the Constitution empowers Congress and
the President to make an appropriate response, is there anything in
the Tenth Amendment . . . that forbids the enlistment of state
officers to make that response effective?
34
In other words, a blanket rule against commandeering would be
inconsistent with the national government's power and responsibility
to respond to certain kinds of emergencies.
This Article shows that application of the Court's anticom-
mandeering doctrine in times of emergency would be inconsistent
with the mechanisms the Constitution creates for the federal govern-
ment to respond to emergencies. In provisions largely forgotten in
modern times, the Constitution specifically authorizes the federal gov-
ernment to commandeer state personnel in periods of emergency. In
the eighteenth century, the principal personnel of state government
were the state's militiamen: militia units, operating under the author-
ity of the state, were responsible for maintaining security, keeping
order, quelling disturbances, and enforcing the state's laws. 3 5 By the
time of the Constitutional Convention, it had become clear that in
certain emergency situations, a state's own militia, operating alone,
would be inadequate to the task of mounting a response. Distur-
bances like Shays' Rebellion in western Massachusetts in January 1787
had highlighted the need for a federally coordinated response to the
most serious emergencies arising within the states.3 6 Yet the revolu-
tionary generation deplored the idea of allowing the federal govern-
ment to maintain and deploy large numbers of federal troops (or
other federal professionals). 37 The result of these competing con-
34 Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
35 See generally LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMs 81 (1982) (describing
the role of militias in early American state governments); JOHN K. MAHON, THE AMERI-
CAN MILITIA 32-46 (1960) (discussing state militia in the 1790s); S.T. Ansell, Legal and
Historical Aspects of Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471, 474-80 (1917) (describing the historical
development of the American militia).
36 See generally DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION 120 (1980) ("The crisis
atmosphere engendered by agrarian discontent strengthened the resolve of the
nationalists and shocked some reluctant localists into an acceptance of a stronger
national government, thereby uniting divergent political elements of commercial
society in the country at large.").
37 See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Con-
text: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 463-70 (2000)
(describing colonial hostility to strong centralized armies).
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cerns-a need for a federal response, but a fear of large numbers of
federal troops-was that the 1789 Constitution permitted the federal
government to commandeer, on a temporary basis, state militiamen in
order to deal with three kinds of emergencies: invasions, insurrec-
tions, and opposition to federal law. Article I of the Constitution
authorizes Congress to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions. '38
Article II makes the President "Commander in Chief... of the Militia
of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States." '3 9 So as to ensure those militiamen would be trained and
equipped when called into periods of federal service, Article I further
gives Congress power to "provide for organizing, arming, and disci-
plining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States. '' 40 Together, these pro-
visions authorized the federal government to respond to emergencies
and gave it the necessary resources to do so-without the need to
deploy the national military or other federal personnel in large num-
bers. Nothing about the Tenth Amendment suggests that it altered
this power of the national government to place state militiamen in
federal service under these circumstances.
In accordance with these constitutional provisions, the early Con-
gress put in place the statutory mechanisms for national comman-
deering of militiamen in order to respond to emergencies in any part
of the country. Congress specified with great care how militiamen
were to be trained and equipped and the circumstances under which
they could be called into federal service. In the ensuing decades, in
responding to emergencies-including defending frontiers, putting
down insurrections, and quelling opposition to federal laws-the
national government regularly relied upon state militiamen under
temporary federal command.
Understanding the constitutional provisions for emergency com-
mandeering and their early uses by the national government to
respond to emergencies has important implications for modern emer-
gencies. The militia units of 1789 no longer exist. However, the fed-
eral government's emergency commandeering power should be
understood today to apply to the modern emergency response person-
nel of state and local governments. Notably, the Constitution does
not define the term "militia," and, in exercising its commandeering
powers, the early Congress itself determined which inhabitants of a
38 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 15.
39 Id. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
40 Id. art. I, § 8, c. 16.
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state comprised the militia for constitutional purposes. Congress is, I
suggest in this Article, permitted to specify that within the meaning of
the Constitution, the militia comprises the states' police officers,
firefighters, and other emergency responders. In dealing with emer-
gencies, the federal government is entitled to call these state employ-
ees into federal service. Further, just as the federal government once
deployed militia units from one state to another, the emergency com-
mandeering power allows the federal government today to dispatch
one state's response personnel to other states.
In recognizing these constitutional provisions for federal com-
mandeering of state personnel and how the provisions might apply to
modern emergencies, it is important to keep in mind some significant
limitations. The Constitution specifically restricts commandeering to
times of invasion, insurrection, and opposition to federal law. Some
kinds of emergencies-for example, a terrorist attack-clearly fall
within these parameters. Other emergencies-for example, a forest
fire-are less obviously within the scope of national power. Still, many
emergencies will trigger the commandeering power because of their
secondary effects: as events in New Orleans following Katrina showed,
natural disasters frequently produce riots and other forms of lawless-
ness that satisfy the Constitution's conditions for federal deployment
of state personnel.
A renewed understanding of the Constitution's emergency com-
mandeering provisions (and their limits) offers the best option for
enhancing the nation's ability to respond effectively to many kinds of
emergencies, without the need to send the national military into our
towns and onto our streets. Future domestic incidents-the detona-
tion of a nuclear device in a city, a chemical weapon attack, a wide-
spread influenza outbreak, or a major earthquake-could easily dwarf
Katrina's impact. 4' In learning from Katrina and preparing for the
next-and potentially more devastating-emergency, the possibility
of emergency commandeering must be given serious consideration.
Part I provides an overview of the governmental structures cur-
rently in place for responding to emergencies. These structures
reflect the basic idea of American federalism that, to the extent possi-
ble, governmental functions should be pushed down to the lowest,
most local, level. Part II uses Hurricane Katrina as a case study to
demonstrate how these structures inhibit the government's ability to
41 For example, a crude nuclear weapon detonated in midtown Manhattan dur-
ing the day would kill up to 200,000 people, destroy buildings in a five-mile radius,
and render much of New York City uninhabitable for decades. REDLENER, supra note
18, at 70.
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prepare for emergencies, prevent their occurrence, and respond
when they happen. Put simply, an emergency on the scale of Katrina
required a kind of governmental coordination that the existing frame-
work did not allow and in many respects impeded. Together, Part III
and Part IV present the emergency commandeering solution. Part III
lays the constitutional and historical framework for federal comman-
deering of state emergency response personnel in times of emer-
gency. Part IV discusses how emergency commandeering would work
in the modern context and the circumstances in which it is proper.
Part V shows why emergency commandeering is consistent with feder-
alism and good for democracy.
1. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
As a matter of national policy, the responsibility for preparing for
and responding to emergencies is located at the lowest practicable
level of government.42 Accordingly, there exists a "pull" system, under
which states are expected to make a specific request (a pull) for fed-
eral emergency assistance before any is provided.43 A federal push (a
response without a specific state request) is limited to unusual circum-
stances, where damage is so massive that state and local officials are
not even able to request federal help. 44 These federalism principles
underlie the major federal statutory and regulatory schemes gov-
erning the provision of emergency relief, discussed briefly in this Part.
A. Civil Emergency Relief Provisions
1. Stafford Act
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act of 1988 ("Stafford Act")45 makes available federal assistance and
42 As the House Committee charged with investigating the Katrina response
explained at the outset of its report:
[I]n the event of an emergency, state and local government officials bear
primary responsibilities under both the National Response Plan and their
own laws and directives. Throughout federal, state and local planning docu-
ments the general principle is for all incidents to be handled at the lowest
possible organizational and jurisdictional level.
FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 18.
43 See THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 18
(2006) [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf.
44 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 31.
45 Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (codified as amended in scattered sections
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federal funding in cases of "emergency"46 or "major disaster."47 The
statute authorizes the President to declare an emergency or major dis-
aster and appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer to oversee the provi-
sion of federal aid.48 Before the President can issue the declaration,
the governor of the affected state must make a specific request to the
President and certify that the disaster or emergency is "of such severity
and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the
State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is
necessary." 49 The state must also implement its own state emergency
plan and provide information to the federal government about state
resources committed to the response.50
Upon declaring a major disaster, the President is authorized to
direct federal agencies to use their resources-including personnel,
equipment, and supplies-in support of state and local assistance
efforts; coordinate disaster relief provided by federal agencies, private
organizations, and state and local governments; provide technical and
advisory assistance to the state; and assist the state with distribution of
supplies.5' Federal agencies can also give assistance "essential to meet-
ing immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major dis-
aster" including providing federal personnel and supplies,
distributing medicine and food, and performing work and services on
public and private lands. 52 The governor can request the President to
direct the Secretary of Defense to make available the resources of the
of 42 U.S.C.). The Act amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288,
88 Stat. 143.
46 Under the Act, an emergency is "any occasion or instance for which, in the
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and
local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health
and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe." 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1)
(2000).
47 A "major disaster" is defined as a
natural catastrophe ... or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion,
in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President
causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster
assistance ... to supplement the efforts and available resources of States,
local governments, and disaster relief organizations.
Id. § 5122(2).
48 See id. § 5143.
49 Id. §§ 5170, 5191 (a).
50 See id. The President is also authorized to issue a declaration sua sponte if "the
emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and
authority." Id. § 5191(b).
51 See id. § 5170a.
52 Id. § 5170b(a).
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Department of Defense "for the purpose of performing on public and
private lands any emergency work... which is essential for the preser-
vation of life and property" for a period of ten days.53 The Act also
authorizes the President to provide housing and other assistance to
individuals affected by the disaster. 54 After declaring an emergency,
the President can direct federal agencies to use resources in support
of state and local emergency assistance efforts "to save lives, protect
property and public health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of
a catastrophe"; coordinate disaster relief; provide technical and advi-
sory assistance to the state; provide aid to affected individuals; and
assist the state with distribution of supplies. 55 In providing support,
federal agencies are permitted under the Act to "accept and utilize
the services or facilities of any State or local government, or of any
agency, office, or employee thereof, with the consent of such govern-
ment. ''56 The President is also permitted to employ relief organiza-
tions like the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. 57 Funding is capped
at $5 million per emergency declaration unless the President deter-
mines there is a continuing need and notifies Congress that the ceil-
ing must be exceeded;58 there is no funding limit for major
disasters.
59
2. Homeland Security Act and FEMA
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002.60 The Act created the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the lead agency for coordi-
nating federal disaster and emergency response and recovery assis-
tance with state and local authorities. 61 Under the Act, the mission of
DHS includes preventing terrorist attacks within the United States;
53 Id. § 5170b(c)(1).
54 See id. §§ 5174, 5177-84.
55 Id. § 5192(a) (1).
56 Id. § 5149(a).
57 See id. § 5152(a)-(b).
58 Id. § 5193.
59 See id.
60 Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 6, 18, 44, 49 U.S.C.).
61 6 U.S.C. § 111(b) (Supp. IV 2004). Within the White House there also exists
the Office of Homeland Security, charged with "develop[ing] and coordinat[ing] the
implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States
from terrorist attacks." Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001).
In addition, the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council advises the Presi-
dent on homeland security matters. Exec. Order No. 13,260, 67 Fed. Reg. 13,241
(Mar. 19, 2002).
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reducing the nation's vulnerability to terrorism; minimizing the dam-
age and assisting in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur;
and serving as a focal point for natural and manmade crises and emer-
gency planning.62 The Act organized DHS into four major "director-
ates" with specified functions: Border and Transportation Security;
Emergency Preparedness and Response; Science and Technology;
and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. 63 Key provi-
sions of the Act are directed at increased cooperation among federal,
state, and local governments and between government and private
entities.
6 4
The Homeland Security Act brought twenty-two preexisting fed-
eral agencies with 180,000 employees under the auspices of DHS.65
Among these agencies was the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). 66 FEMA had been created in 1979, following years
of criticism of the dispersal of emergency response functions through-
out the federal government, to coordinate within a single entity the
federal response to emergencies. 67 The Homeland Security Act made
FEMA part of DHS's Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)
Directorate-along with the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices' Office of Emergency Management, the FBI's National Domestic
Preparedness Office, the Energy Department's Nuclear Incident
Response team, and other emergency entities.68 FEMA's mandate
became to enhance the capacity of state and local governments to
respond to disasters; coordinate federal response agencies; and pro-
vide financial assistance to state and local governments and directly to
citizens in case of disasters. 69 EPR as a whole was responsible for over-
seeing domestic disaster preparedness training; providing federal sup-
port for recovery from terrorist acts and natural disasters; promoting
the effectiveness of emergency responders; and formulating a federal
62 6 U.S.C. § 111(b).
63 See id. §§ 121, 181, 201, 311.
64 See, e.g., id. § 112(c) (directing the secretary of DHS to: coordinate with state
and local governments and private entities with respect to planning, equipment, and
training and exercise activities; coordinate and consolidate communications systems
with state and local governments and private entities; and distribute warnings and
information to state and local government personnel and to the public).
65 See Homeland Security Accountability and Performance Evaluation Process: Hearings
on H.R 2886 Before the H. Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 5 (2003)
(statement of Bruce M. Carnes, Chief Financial Officer, Department of Homeland
Security) (discussing the creation of DHS).
66 6 U.S.C. § 313.
67 Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 C.F.R. 412 (1979).
68 6 U.S.C. § 313.
69 Id. § 317.
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emergency response plan for natural disasters, attacks, and hazards. 70
EPR was also responsible for coordinating with state, local, and public
safety organizations to develop a comprehensive national crisis man-
agement system; in the event of a national emergency, EPR had
authority to command federal response teams working with personnel
at the local and state levels.71 In July 2005, DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff reorganized the Department of Homeland Security, abolish-
ing EPR; he transferred preparedness functions to a new Prepared-
ness Directorate, leaving FEMA a separate DHS entity dealing
exclusively with response and recovery. 72 Under the National
Response Plan, FEMA now has primary responsibility for coordinating
the federal response to all emergencies. 73
3. National Response Plan
In 2004, DHS released a "National Response Plan" (NRP),74 a sin-
gle operational plan for responding to emergencies, including terror-
ist attacks and natural and accidental disasters, along with a "National
Incident Management System" (NIMS) 75 to manage the implementa-
tion of the NRP. The NRP was used for the first time during Hurri-
cane Katrina. 76 The NRP creates an overall framework for responding
to emergencies. 77 In essence, it sets out which federal agencies are
responsible for specific emergency functions, and provides a road
map for agencies to interact with state and local governments, non-
governmental organizations, and the private sector in preventing, pre-
paring for, and responding to emergencies. Throughout the plan,
70 Id. § 312.
71 Id.; see also KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRANSFER OF FEMA TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY app. A, at 12-22 (2002), available at http://digi-
tal.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-2793:1 (summarizing FEMA's
responsibilities).
72 Michael Chertoff, U.S. Sec'y of Homeland Sec., Second Stage Review Remarks
(July 13, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_
0255.shtm).
73 See infra Part I.A.3.
74 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (2004) [hereinafter
NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP-Full
Text.pdf.
75 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (2004)
[hereinafter NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM], available at http://www.fema.
gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nimsdocffull.pdf.
76 Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., United States Government Response to
the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 1, 2005), available at https://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/releases/press release_0727.shtm.
77 See NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 74, at 2.
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localism is favored: the plan states under its "Planning Assumptions
and Considerations" that "[i] ncidents are typically managed at the
lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level." 78
Though the NRP is an "all-hazards plan"79 designed to apply to a
variety of emergencies, it is limited to "actual or potential Incidents of
National Significance." 80 Incidents of national significance are emer-
gencies that "[o] ccur ... with little or no warning," "[i] nvolve signifi-
cant or multiple geographic areas," and "[r]esult in numerous
casualties; fatalities; displaced people; property loss; disruption of nor-
mal life-support systems, essential public services, and basic infrastruc-
ture; and significant damage to the environment."8' In particular,
emergencies and major disasters declared by the President under the
Stafford Act are incidents of national significance for purposes of the
NRP.82 The NRP is also triggered whenever a federal agency requests
the assistance of DHS, multiple federal agencies are involved in
responding to an incident (such as in the case of threatened acts of
terrorism), or the President directs DHS to manage a domestic inci-
dent.83 Still, even in the event of incidents of national significance,
state government remains responsible for performing its traditional
functions like law enforcement; the federal government provides sup-
port only after a specific request from a state.84
There are thirty-two "signatory partners" to the NRP.85 These
include the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the
American Red Cross.86 These partners serve as a primary or support
agency in one or more of the fifteen "Emergency Support Functions"
(ESFs) under the NRP.8 7 ESFs are the vehicles through which the
resources of relevant federal agencies are funneled. 88 The Primary
Agency is responsible for overall coordination of the federal
response.89 Support Agencies provide additional assistance at the
request of the Primary Agency.90 For example, ESF #13, "Public Safety
78 Id. at 6.
79 Id. at 1.
80 Id. at 3.
81 Id. at 6.
82 See id. at 7.
83 See id. at 4.
84 See id. at 88.
85 Id. at v-viii.
86 See id.
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and Security," is intended to "provide[ a mechanism for coordinat-
ing and providing Federal-to-Federal support or Federal support to
State and local authorities to include non-investigative/non-criminal
law enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities and
resources."91 ESF #13 specifies that while "[i]n most incident situa-
tions, local jurisdictions have primary . . . responsibility for law
enforcement activities," federal resources can supplement state and
local resources when they are overwhelmed. 92 ESF #13 sets out the
various federal agencies and their functions in providing law enforce-
ment assistance to states and localities.93 DHS and the Department of
Justice are the primary agencies under this support function.
94
Incident Annexes provide information about contingencies that
require unique application of the NRP in specialized hazardous inci-
dents including biological hazards and terrorism. 95 Recognizing that
in especially dire conditions the infrastructure of government might
be destroyed such that state and local responders might be unable
even to request federal assistance, the NRP allows for a proactive fed-
eral response in limited circumstances. Under the NRP's "Cata-
strophic Incident Annex," when a "catastrophic incident" occurs, DHS
has authority to initiate the federal response without waiting for a
request from a state or local government: the system switches from the
traditional pull to a push function.96 However, the Annex includes an
operating presumption that federal resources deployed pursuant to
this provision will wait at staging areas and only be employed when
requested by the local command.97 No catastrophic incident has ever
been declared under the NRP.
When the NRP is activated, various personnel and entities coordi-
nate support on the ground. The Secretary of DHS is responsible for
declaring the existence of an incident of national significance and for
naming a Principal Federal Official (PFO) to manage the response.9 8
Response efforts are coordinated and carried out in the field through




95 See id. incident annexes, at INC-i.
96 See id. catastrophic incident annex, at CAT-i to CAT-4. Catastrophic incidents
are defined as "any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or govern-
ment functions." Id. at CAT-1.
97 See id. at CAT-2.
98 See id. at 9. Secretary Chertoff declared Katrina an Incident of National Signifi-
cance on September 1, 2005 (the first such declaration under the NRP) and
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incident command posts, state and local operations centers, regional
response coordination centers,joint field offices, and joint operations
centers.99 At DHS headquarters, the Homeland Security Operations
Center and the National Response Coordination Center provide man-
agerial support and coordinate activities on the ground; the Inter-
agency Incident Management Group, a coalition of federal
governmental representatives, facilitates interagency coordination. 100
4. Federal Funding
The federal government provides substantial funding to state and
local governments to prepare for and respond to emergencies. The
Department of Homeland Security administers a large federal grant
program to fund first responders. For fiscal year 2006, DHS allocated
$1.7 billion under its Homeland Security Grants Program to states,
urban areas, and territories to prepare for and respond to terrorist
attacks and other disasters.101 The program includes five separate
kinds of grants: the State Homeland Security Grant Program ($544.5
million in fiscal year 2006); the Urban Areas Security Initiative ($757.3
million); the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program ($396
million); the Metropolitan Medical Response System ($29.7 million);
and the Citizen Corps Program ($19.8 million). 102 Other federal
agencies also provide grants to states and localities.
10 3
5. EMAC
During emergencies, states often require assistance from other
states. Under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC), approved by Congress in 1996,104 participating states have
appointed Michael Brown as the PFO. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., supra
note 76.
99 NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 74, at 19-21.
100 See id. at 22-23.
101 Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces $1.7 Billion in Home-
land Security Grants (May 31, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/
releases/press_release_0921 .shtm.
102 Id.
103 For example, the Department of Health and Human Services provides funding
for countering bioterrorism. Press Release, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS
Announces Bioterrorism Aid for States, Including Special Opportunity for Advance
Funding (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/
20030320.html. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention fund various health
related programs. See About CDC Funding and Procurement, http://www.cdc.gov/
about/business/funding.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
104 See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110
Stat. 3877 (1996).
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pledged to help other member states overwhelmed by disasters. 10 5
EMAC creates a mechanism for an affected state to request a variety of
resources from other states, including National Guard personnel. 10 6
A requesting state has responsibility for reimbursing other states for
the cost of their assistance.
10 7
B. The Military and Emergencies
The military also plays a role in preventing and responding to
emergencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) distinguishes
between "homeland security" and "homeland defense." Homeland
security is "a concerted national effort to reduce America's vulnerabil-
ities, prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, and minimize
the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."' 08 DOD contrib-
utes to homeland security in three ways. First, DOD conducts military
missions abroad. 10 9 Second, DOD is responsible for "homeland
defense."1 0 Homeland defense, then, is the "protection of U.S. sover-
eignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure
against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by
the President.""' Such threats might materialize internally.' 12 Third,
DOD provides "Civil Support" to a lead civil agency in three general
circumstances: support to civil agencies in cases of domestic emergen-
cies and disasters; support to civilian law enforcement including
counter terrorism support; and support for responding to civil distur-
bances in accordance with the President's constitutional authority to
suppress insurrections. 113 Support is provided only when other fed-
105 See Emergency Management Assistance Compact Homepage, http://www.
emacweb.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). All fifty states have joined EMAC, as have
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See id. See generally
Alan D. Cohn, Mutual Aid: Intergovernmental Agreements for Emergency Preparedness and
Response, 37 URB. LAW. 1, 22-26 (2005) (describing the EMAC's basic protocol for
state-to-state disaster assistance and discussing some of the inherent limitations of the
system).
106 Nat'l Guard, The National Guard's Role in Homeland Defense: EMAC Fact
Sheet, http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/HomelandDefense/emac/factsheet.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
107 See EMAC, How Does EMAC Work?, http://www.emacweb.org/?142 (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2007).
108 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-26, HOMELAND SECURITY, at 1-3 fig.




112 See id. at vi.
113 Id. at 1-3, IV-4 to 1V-7.
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eral, state, and local resources are overwhelmed. 1 4 Numerous regula-
tory provisions govern the provision of civil support.11 5 Domestically,
United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), established Octo-
ber 1, 2002, has command and control of DOD homeland defense
efforts and is responsible for coordinating military assistance to civil
authorities. 1
6
In addition to regular military forces, the National Guard pro-
vides emergency assistance. Federal law creates two overlapping but
distinct organizations: the National Guard of the states and the
National Guard of the United States.1 17 Individuals who enlist in a
state National Guard are simultaneously enlisted in the National
Guard of the United States, as part of the Enlisted Reserve Corps of
the Army' 18 When ordered into active federal service, members of
the National Guard are relieved from state service." 9 States are
required to train National Guard units in accordance with army and
air force standards120 and the army and air force specify the equip-
ment guard units must maintain.12 1 There are more than 450,000
members of the National Guard in 3200 communities around the
country. 122
114 See id. at IV-1.
115 See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive No. 3025.1, Military Support to Civil
Authorities (MSCA) (Jan. 15, 1993), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/302501p.pdf; Department of Defense Directive No. 3025.12, Military
Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) (Feb. 4, 1994), available at http://www.
dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302512p.pdf; Department of Defense Directive
No. 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (Feb. 18, 1997), available at http:/
/www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302515p.pdf.; Department of Defense
Directive No. 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials (Jan.
15, 1986), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/552505p.pdf.
116 See About U.S. Northern Command, http://www.northcom.mil/about/
index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
117 National Defense Act Amendments of 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153 (repealed
1956). The National Guard originated in the 1903 Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775
(promoting the efficiency of the militia and forming the Organized Militia as the
"State National Guard," in accordance with the organization of the army, and with
federal funds and army instructors), and the 1916 National Defense Act, ch. 134, 39
Stat. 166 (making the National Guard part of the army). The Supreme Court under-
stands the National Guard to be equivalent to the "militia" in the Constitution. See
Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 347-51 (1990).
118 See 10 U.S.C. § 101(c)(2)-(3) (2000); 32 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000).
119 32 U.S.C.A. § 325(a) (West Supp. 2007).
120 32 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000).
121 Id. § 701.
122 SeeJohn Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub.
L. No. 109-364, § 411, 120 Stat. 2083, 2170 (2006) (authorizing for fiscal year 2007
reserve end strengths of 350,000 for the Army National Guard and 107,000 for the Air
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States may call state Guard units to active status, in which case
they operate under the command of the governor and are funded by
the state government. 123 National Guard forces also operate under
two federal provisions: Title 10 and Title 32. Title 10 governs all fed-
eral military forces: active duty, reserve, and the National Guard when
federalized. 124 National Guard forces operating under Title 10 are
funded by the federal government and are under the command of the
Commander in Chief.125 Guard units can also be deployed in Title 32
status, under which the units remain under the command of the gov-
ernor 26 but support federal war efforts and so receive federal fund-
ing.' 27 Congress has authorized the use of the armed forces,
including the National Guard (and in certain circumstances the mili-
tia) to respond to insurrections, ensure the enforcement of federal
law, and to protect federal constitutional rights. 28
1. The Posse Comitatus Act
Enacted out of opposition to federal troops' activities (including
guarding polling stations) in the South during Reconstruction, 2 9 the
1878 Posse Comitatus Act130 prohibits the active duty military from
National Guard); Clyde A. Vaughn, Army National Guard: An Integral Part of Army
Strong, ARMY, Oct. 2007, at 133, 134 (reporting that as of April 2007 there were
350,821 soldiers in the Army National Guard); Bob Haskell, Guard Has Banner Year
for Recruiting, Retention, AIR FORCE LINK, Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/
story.asp?id=123028845 (reporting that at the end of fiscal year 2006 there were
346,288 members of the Army National Guard and 105,660 members of the Air
National Guard for a combined strength of 451,948 members); E-mail from Emanuel
Pacheco, Office of Pub. Affairs, Nat'l Guard Bureau, to author (Oct. 11, 2007 10:31
EST) (reporting a guard membership of 458,000 in 3,200 communities).
123 See, e.g., N.Y. MIL. LAW § 6 (McKinney 1990) ("[W]henever it shall be made to
appear to the governor that there is a breach of the peace, riot, resistance to process
of this state or disaster or imminent danger thereof, the governor may order into the
active service of the state . . . all or any part of the organized militia.").
124 Title 10 is entitled "Armed Forces" and § 101 defines the National Guard as
falling under that Title's purview. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West. Supp. 2007).
125 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-332, 12406 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007).
126 See, e.g., 32 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
127 See id. § 502(f) (authorizing the calling up of the National Guard for "training
or other duty"); see also id. §§ 106, 113 (providing for appropriations to the National
Guard).
128 See infra Part III.D.
129 During House debates over the Act, southern Democrats, who had gained seats
in the 1876 election, targeted in particular the President's use of troops as a posse. 7
CONG. REc. 3850 (1878).
130 Ch. 263, 20 Stat. 145 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000)).
[VOL. 83:1
THE COMMANDEERER IN CHIEF
performing law enforcement functions within the United States. 131
Exceptions to the statutory prohibition include National Guard forces
on state active duty or under Title 32;132 federal troops under the
authority of the President to quell insurrections; 33 and narcotics work
authorized by Congress.' 34 The Posse Comitatus Act also does not
apply to the Coast Guard. 135 Congress has also specified that the mili-
tary may provide "indirect" assistance to civil law enforcement so long
as the assistance is not "direct participation." 36 Troops may, for
example, provide assistance with emergency search and rescue efforts
or supply equipment and intelligence; the support, however, may not
take the form of law enforcement-for example, making arrests.
13 7
2. State Militia Laws
States have militia, organized into different categories.138 In New
York, for instance, the militia is divided into the organized militia and
the unorganized militia. The organized militia comprises the Army
National Guard, Navy National Guard, Air National Guard, the inac-
tive National Guard, the New York Naval Militia, the New York Guard
when organized, and other State defense forces created by the gover-
nor.139 The unorganized militia consists of "all able-bodied male
131 Id.
132 Philip Oates, Supporting the National Strategy for Homeland Security: The Role of the
National Guard, in FiRST To ARRIVE 163, 165-66 (Juliette N. Kayyem & Robyn L. Pangi
eds., 2003).
133 See 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-334 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007).
134 Under the 1989 National Guard Counter-Drug Support Program (CDSP),
National Guard personnel in Title 32 status are permitted to provide support to drug
law enforcement agencies. See 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
135 See 14 U.S.C. § 89 (2000) (authorizing the Coast Guard to perform law
enforcement functions).
136 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2000).
137 See id. § 382.
138 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-5 (LexisNexis 1998) ("The unorganized militia shall
consist of all able-bodied male resident citizens ... who have declared their intention
to become citizens of the United States, between the ages of seventeen and forty five,
and of such other persons, male and female, as may, upon their own application, be
enlisted or commissioned therein .... ); AiASKA STAT. § 26.05.010 (2006) ("The mili-
tia of the state consists of all able-bodied citizens of the United States and all other
able-bodied persons who have declared their intention to become citizens of the
United States, who reside in the state, who are at least 17 years of age, and who are
eligible for military service under the laws of the United States or this state."); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 250.02(1) (West Supp. 2007) ("The militia consists of all able-bodied
citizens of this state and all other able-bodied persons who have declared their inten-
tion to become citizens.").
139 N.Y. MIL. LAw § 2.1 (McKinney 1990).
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residents of the state between the ages of seventeen and forty-five"
except those who are already serving in the organized militia or are on
the reserve or retired list.140 States make their governors the com-
mander in chief of their militia forces.' 4 ' States also have provisions
for placing the state militia under federal command.
142
C. Miscellaneous Emergency Provisions
A variety of other federal laws provide for the federal government
to take action during health crises, environmental catastrophes, wars,
or other emergency situations. 43 For example, the Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 provides for a federal
response to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruc-
tion.14 4 Continuity of government plans provide for, among other
things, evacuation of government personnel during times of emer-
140 Id. § 2.2. State statutes also allow the governor to organize the State Guard,
distinct from the National Guard. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 33-14-1 (Supp. 2007)
(authorizing the governor to organize the "South Dakota State Guard" in order "to
protect life and property in this state").
141 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 28-3-104 (2007) ("The governor shall be the com-
mander in chief of the military forces except so much thereof as may be in the actual
service of the United States and may employ the same for the defense or relief of the
state, the enforcement of its laws, the protection of life and property therein, the
implementation of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, and for the
training of the military forces for all appropriate state missions.").
142 See, e.g., N.Y. MIL. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1990) ("[T]he powers of the United
States . . . may be exercised over the militia of the state.").
143 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2273 (2000) (authorizing federal assistance to states for
search and rescue); 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (providing for order-
ing reserve forces to active duty during time of war or emergency); 33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1257-1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing the President to respond to
discharges of oil and hazardous substances into navigable waters); 42 U.S.C. § 243(a)
(2000) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to accept assistance
from state and local authorities to enforce federal quarantine laws; requiring the Sec-
retary to assist states in the prevention and suppression of communicable diseases); 42
U.S.C. § 264 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (authorizing the Surgeon General to pass and
enforce regulations to prevent the spread of communicable diseases including for
quarantining affected individuals under some circumstances); 42 U.S.C. § 266 (2000
& Supp. IV 2004) (providing for the quarantine of infected individuals in time of war
to protect the armed forces); 42 U.S.C.A §§ 9601-9627 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007)
(authorizing the President to respond to the release of hazardous substances, pollu-
tants, and contaminants); 44 U.S.C. § 3505 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (assigning respon-
sibility to senior executive agency officials to secure federal government information
systems); 50 U.S.C. § 82 (2000) (authorizing the President in times of war to take over
factories).
144 Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1413, 110 Stat. 2714, 2719-20 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C.A. § 2313 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).
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gency and the operation of government from secure locations. 45
There are also various federal mitigation programs directed at long-
term risk reduction. 146 More generally, in exercising emergency pow-
ers, the President and other federal officers are subject to the provi-
sions of the National Emergencies Act.' 47 The Act requires an
emergency declaration and specification of the emergency powers
being exercised, and imposes time limits on the use of emergency
powers. 1
4 8
State laws set out the powers and responsibilities of the governor
and state agencies during times of emergency. 149 Consider, for exam-
ple, emergency laws in place in Louisiana. Under the Louisiana Con-
stitution, the Governor is "commander-in-chief of the armed forces of
the state" and "may call out these forces to preserve law and order, to
suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, or in other times of emer-
gency.' 150 The constitution provides for an "Interim Emergency
Board" comprising of the governor and other high-ranking officials to
appropriate state funds in times of emergencies. 151 Under statutory
law, the governor of Louisiana is responsible for "meeting the dangers
to the state and people presented by emergencies or disasters."' 52 In
times of emergencies and disasters, the governor can issue executive
orders that have the force of law and "[u]tilize all available resources
145 See HAROLD C. RELYFA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT
CRS-5 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21089.pdf (summarizing
statutory and regulatory provisions).
146 For example, various federal mapping programs, like FEMA's National Flood
Insurance Program, map specific hazards. See 42 U.S.C. § 4101 (2000); see also FEMA:
National Flood Insurance Program, http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/fhm/
index.shtm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007) (offering references and resources related to
flood hazard mapping). Mitigation programs include the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5170 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); the National Earthquake
Hazard Reduction Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7704 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); the
National Hurricane Program, FEMA: National Hurricane Program, http://www.
fema.gov/plan/prevent/nhp/index.shtm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); and the Fire
Prevention and Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2231 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007).
147 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2000).
148 Id. §§ 1621-1622, 1639.
149 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-12-1 (LexisNexis 2007) (detailing quarantine laws);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-131 (Supp. 2007) (setting out responsibilities of the Public
Health Emergency Response Authority); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-101 (2005) (speci-
fying the governor's powers and duties in emergencies). See generally DOMESTIC WMD
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT LEGAL DESKBOOK app. b-state, at B-i to B-24, available at
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/DOD/manual/index.htm (collecting state statutory
provisions).
150 LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
151 Id. art. VII, § 7.
152 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29:724(A) (2007).
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of the state government and of each political subdivision of the state
as reasonably necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency."
153
Many states also have their own emergency management authori-
ties. 154 A majority of states have adopted emergency legislation based
on the Model State Emergency Health Power Act.' 55 The Act allows
the governor of a state to take control of public health, transportation,
business, and law enforcement during a public health crisis, including
by ordering quarantines and forced vaccinations, and by seizing any
supplies needed to respond to the crisis.
156
II. KATRINA AND FEDERALISM
This Part examines how these various emergency provisions
played out in the context of Hurricane Katrina. The discussion begins
with a brief overview of Katrina's impact and the nature of the govern-
ment's preparations and response. It next examines how federalism
interfered with relief efforts and hindered the government's response
to the hurricane. The discussion then turns to the specific problem of
maintaining security during Katrina and the role of the military.
A. Katrina's Impact
Impacting a region spanning some 93,000 square miles, Hurri-
cane Katrina was the most expensive natural disaster, and among the
deadliest, in the history of the United States. 157 Katrina made landfall
at Buras, Louisiana, on the morning of August 29, 2005, causing death
and physical damage across Louisiana and in the coastal communities
of Mississippi and Alabama. 158 When its levees breached, much of
New Orleans was quickly submerged; entire sections of the city were
153 Id. § 29:724(D) (2). The Louisiana legislature can terminate the state of disas-
ter or emergency at any time with a petition signed by a majority of the surviving
members of either house. Id. § 29:724(B) (2).
154 For a directory, see FEMA: State Offices and Agencies of Emergency Manage-
ment, http://www.fema.gov/about/contact/statedr.shtm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
For a directory of state homeland security offices, see GEORGE D. HADDOW &JANE A.
BULLOCK, INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 348-57 (2d ed. 2006).
155 See CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB. HEALTH, GEORGETOWN &JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS.,
THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH PoWERS ACT (MSEHPA) STATE LEGISLATIVE
ACTIVITY 1 (2006), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%20
Activity.pdf (reporting that as of July 15, 2006, forty-four states and the District of
Columbia had passed legislation based on the Act).
156 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH PoWERs Ac §§ 501-507, 601-608, 701-702
(Ctr. for Law & the Pub. Health, Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs. 2001).
157 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 5. This report estimates that Katrina
caused $96 billion in damage. Id. at 7.
158 See BRINKLEY, supra note 11, at 133, 159.
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obliterated. 5 9 In western Mississippi, the storm surge reached thirty-
four feet and extended inland ten miles; hurricane force winds
reached as far asJackson and ripped up thousands of homes along the
way, rendering swaths of the state uninhabitable. 60 Waveland, Missis-
sippi, was simply wiped off the map. 16 1 In Alabama, Katrina produced
large-scale flooding and substantial wind damage in coastal towns.' 62
All told, 1330 people died-the majority from New Orleans, many of
whom were elderly-while thousands of others were injured.163 Some
300,000 homes were rendered uninhabitable, 164 and 770,000 people
were displaced. 165 Weeks after Katrina, 1831 children were still miss-
ing. 16 6 Katrina produced massive and long-lasting environmental
damage; 167 it ruined agricultural, forestry, fishing, and other indus-
tries in the affected regions; 168 and, according to the Department of
Energy, it caused "unprecedented damage" to the nation's energy
sector. 1
6 9
159 See id. at 181-226.
160 See id. at 147-80.
161 News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Sept. 7, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/uly-decO5/miss 9-7.html)
(quoting Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, stating that "Waveland, Mississippi has
no inhabitable structures-none").
162 BRINKLEY, supra note 11, at 545-46.
163 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 33; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., A PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA's DISASTER MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRIJA 4-5 (2006) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE
REVIEW], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-32_Mar06.
pdf (reporting that Hurricane Katrina caused 1326 deaths (1096 in Louisiana, 228 in
Mississippi and 2 in Alabama); displaced more than 700,000 people and destroyed
300,000 homes).
164 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 7.
165 Id. at 8.
166 Barbara Kantrowitz & Karen Breslau, Some Are Found, All Are Lost, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 50, 51.
167 See Louisiana Hurricane Resources, Energy Oil, & Gas, http://www.laseagrant.
org/hurricane/archive/oil.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007) (reporting how damage to
the oil infrastructure spilled millions of gallons of oil into the region's waterways).
168 See Spencer S. Hsu, In Mississippi, Katrina Yields Bitter Harvest, WASH. POST, Mar.
12, 2006, at A3 ("All told, Mississippi's agriculture, forestry and marine industries-
which account for one-third of the jobs and economic product of... [the] state-lost
more than $10 billion.").
169 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 34.
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B. The Government's Response
By widespread consensus, the response to Katrina at all levels of
government-federal, state, and local-was deficient. 170  Though
there was ample warning that Katrina would require a massive deploy-
ment of personnel and resources to the affected region, government
officials made insufficient advance preparations, and, after the hurri-
cane hit, were unable to respond quickly or effectively. Americans
watched with astonishment the broadcasted evidence of governmental
ineptitude: people huddled on rooftops begging to be rescued; bodies
floating down streets (unless they were tied up to lampposts); nursing
home residents left to fend for themselves; refugees stranded on Inter-
state 10; elderly people pushed around in shopping carts; and the
wheelchair-bound left to rot in the sun.
171
Evacuation is an obvious precaution when a hurricane looms.
However, government officials failed to evacuate large numbers of
residents from Katrina's path, a failure that produced avoidable casu-
alties and required dangerous post-landfall rescues. 172 The govern-
ment also had inadequate plans for post-landfall evacuations: "Despite
years of recognition of the threat that was to materialize in Hurricane
Katrina, no one-not the federal government, not the state govern-
ment, and not the local government-seem[ed] to have planned for
an evacuation of [New Orleans] from flooding through breached lev-
170 See, e.g., Lewis H. Lapham, The Simple Life: Hurricane Relief HARPER'S MAG., Dec.
2005, at 9, 9 (describing "the government's murderously incompetent response to
Hurricane Katrina"); Michael Mayo, Katrina Reveals Some Hard, Frightening Truths, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 4, 2005, at IB (stating that "the federal government's flat-
footed, incompetent and utterly indifferent response in the critical days after the
storm made a terrible situation worse"); Andrew Sullivan, Earth to the President: Warn-
ings Ignored at Your Peril-Katrina's Wake, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.the
australian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,16492678-2703,00.html ("The seeming inabil-
ity of the federal or city authorities to act swiftly or effectively to rescue survivors or
maintain order posed fundamental questions about the competence of George W.
Bush's administration and local authorities."); S.T. Karnick, New Age Conservatism,
NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 13, 2006, http://author.nationalreview.com/?q=MjcMA=&
p=MjAwNg= (follow "New Age Conservatism" hyperlink) ("[T]he Republicans threw
away their reputation for competence and the value of limited government with their
inept response to the Katrina disaster.").
171 See, e.g., FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 74, 114, 294-95; CNNNewsnight
Aaron Brown: Nursing Home Deaths; Missing Children; Homeless Police Officers; Hospital Hor-
ror (CNN television broadcast Sept. 13, 2005) (transcript available at http://tran-
scripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/13/asb.02.html).
172 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 114.
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ees."'1 73 For example, there were not enough buses to transport peo-
ple to safer ground, and there was a shortage of drivers. 1
74
FEMA's response to Katrina has received particular rebuke.
FEMA "seemed unable to implement lessons that should have been
learned well in advance of Katrina.'1 7 5 FEMA failed to pre-position
adequate supplies and to secure contracts with suppliers. 176 It lacked
sufficient knowledge about and failed to communicate adequately
with other federal agencies that could furnish supplies. 7 7 FEMA
failed to implement procedures for accepting and managing charita-
ble donations and assistance from abroad 178 and for integrating faith-
based and nongovernmental organizations into relief efforts. 179 The
Agency performed poorly in providing emergency housing to victims
and making available direct rental assistance. °8 0 As measured by its
staffing, training, and planning, FEMA was ill-prepared for a cata-
strophic event,1 8 ' and the Agency did not even have an effective sys-
tem for assessing state readiness or determining preparedness
standards states needed to meet.
8 2
With Katrina, the National Response Plan clearly failed its first
test. Despite advanced warnings about the magnitude of the storm,
critical elements of the Plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at
all.' 8 3 Many federal agencies, it turned out, did not even understand
their roles and responsibilities under the NRP. 18 4 Incredibly, despite
the significant role the NRP assigns to DHS (and to FEMA in particu-
lar), that department had not made preparations for an emergency of
Katrina's scale.18 5 DHS and FEMA turned out to have inadequate
numbers of trained and experienced staff to implement the NRP;186
173 Id. at 123.
174 See id. at 119-22.
175 Id. at 13.
176 LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 43, at 44-45.
177 See id. at 45.
178 See id.
179 See id. at 49; see also BRINKLEY, supra note 11, at 554 ("Over and over again,
FEMA actually stopped truckloads of supplies, water, or ice on some bureaucratic
pretext or other.").
180 See LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 43, at 50.
181 See PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 163, at 109.
182 See id. at 138. This report recommends that DHS provide states with training
on the components of the National Preparedness System and develop a mechanism to
measure a state's response capacities. Id. at 140.
183 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 131, 133-34 (reporting that DHS was
unduly slow in designating Katrina an incident of national significance).
184 See id. at 143-44; LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 53.
185 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 153-54.
186 See id. at 155-56.
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FEMA's response teams were not ready to respond 18 7 and lacked
experience working with other federal agencies and coordinating with
their state counterparts, the very things the NRP is designed to
accomplish.' 8
C. The Problem of Federalism
A commitment to federalism hampered relief efforts. For one, it
produced unnecessary delay. In hewing to the federalist notion that
the national government should not intervene until invited, the NRP
did not take adequate account of situations, like Katrina, where local
government could be so affected by an emergency that it would be
unable even to make a request for federal assistance. 189 Hence, on
Monday, August 29, 2005, with the hurricane making landfall, FEMA
Director Michael Brown directed all emergency responders from
outside the region to stay away until local authorities specifically
requested their help: "The response to Hurricane Katrina must be
well coordinated between federal, state, and local officials to most
effectively protect life and property."190 U.S. Fire Administrator R.
David Paulison added, "It is critical that fire and emergency depart-
ments across the country remain in their jurisdictions until such time
as the affected states request assistance."'19' Consistent with this
approach, National Guardsmen were ordered to prevent emergency
responders even from entering New Orleans.
192
Much of the failed response resulted from the absence of a clear
command structure to direct the relief effort. 19 3 Local governments
lost command centers and could not coordinate with each other.
94
Local police departments were largely crippled: "[t]he New Orleans
Police Department ... lost command and control over ... [officers
who] reported to work. This resulted in delays in determining where
problems were, dispatching officers to those locations, and otherwise
187 Id. at 158.
188 See id. at 152.
189 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 42, 52.
190 Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, First Responders Urged Not To
Respond to Hurricane Impact Areas Unless Dispatched by State, Local Authorities
(Aug. 29, 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.fema.
gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18470; see also BRINKLEY, supra note 11, at 254 (dis-
cussing the emergency responders' reaction to the FEMA press release).
191 Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra note 190.
192 BRINKLEY, supra note 11, at 254.
193 See, e.g., id. at 194-95.
194 FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 184.
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planning and prioritizing operations." 195 State command centers also
experienced operational weaknesses that undermined unity of com-
mand. 196 When the abilities of state and local governments to issue
commands and exercise control are impaired, the national govern-
ment can play an important role in coordinating response efforts.
However, during Katrina there was no unified federal command struc-
ture in place. 197 The Joint Field Office, meant to provide a single
location to coordinate all federal agencies, was not established quickly
enough and the Principal Federal Officer was sluggish in naming and
assembling his staff.198 As a result, "agencies independently deployed
resources, operated autonomously, and generated disparate reporting
streams back to Federal authorities locally and in Washington." 199
Not surprisingly, this led to "an often inconsistent and inaccurate
operating picture of the disaster area[,] . . .duplication of efforts,
gaps in addressing requests for assistance, and the inefficient alloca-
tion of resources. ' 20 0 Notably, these problems were not merely the
result of poor execution of the NRP but also revealed some funda-
mental defects in the readiness of federal government personnel. 20 1
Damage to communications infrastructure exacerbated the problem
of coordinating the work of emergency response personnel.
Throughout the Gulf region, there was a "massive" failure of commu-
nications systems. 20 2 The New Orleans Police Department simultane-
ously lost its radio system, cellular communications, and landlines.203
In the absence of adequate communications networks to share infor-
mation from those at the scene, local, state, and federal officials were
"forced to depend on a variety of conflicting reports from a combina-
tion of media, government and private sources, many of which contin-
ued to provide inaccurate or incomplete information throughout the
day, further clouding the understanding of what was occurring in New
Orleans. "204
All of this undermined a coordinated response on the ground.
Though federal search and rescue personnel joined state and local
195 Id. at 195.
196 See id. at 186-87.
197 See id. at 189-90.
198 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 42.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See id. at 50 ("Insufficient planning, training, and interagency coordination are
not problems that began and ended with Hurricane Katrina.").
202 FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 163.
203 See BRINKLEY, supra note 11, at 202.
204 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 35.
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personnel,20 5 these joint operations were disordered. 20 6 For example,
the NRP had made no provision for specialized urban search and res-
cue teams that rescue victims trapped in collapsed structures to work
together with more generalized civil search and rescue teams.
20 7
Seemingly vital federal resources, like Department of Interior person-
nel with expertise in water rescues, were not used at all. 20 8 While
thousands of people were eventually evacuated from the affected
region, the evacuation process was haphazard: "Federal and State offi-
cials often had difficulty coordinating the departures and destinations
of the . .. buses, trains, and aircraft involved in the evacuations....
Buses and flights of evacuees were sometimes diverted, while en route,
to new destinations without the knowledge of officials at either the
original or new destinations." 20 9 In the absence of clear lines of com-
mand, federal and state officials squabbled about who was responsible
for recovering bodies of victims, leading to delays in recovery
efforts. 21
0
With all of these problems of coordination, it would be reasona-
ble to expect radical revisions to the National Response Plan. Here,
though, the principal governmental reports on Katrina remain cau-
tious. The House Commission endorsed the inescapable conclusion
that, during incidents like Katrina where local and state governments
are incapacitated, the federal government should be proactive and
not wait for state and local officials to "pull" for federal help. 211 None-
theless, the Commission concluded: "Implementing a push system-a
proactive federal response-does not require federalization of the dis-
205 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 38.
206 See id. at 194.
207 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 38.
208 See id.
209 Id. at 40.
210 See id. at 48. Given all of the failures during Katrina, it is well to note what did
work. The House Committee concluded that EMAC "successfully provided unprece-
dented levels of response and recovery personnel and assets to the Gulf coast in
record time." FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 132. EMAC facilitated assistance
from forty-eight states and allowed the deployment of 67,891 personnel (19,481 civil-
ians and 48,477 National Guard) to Louisiana and Mississippi. Id. at 144. California,
for example, deployed eight Swift Water Rescue teams to the region. BRINKLEY, supra
note 11, at 415. EMAC was especially critical for sending law enforcement personnel
and National Guard units for security. See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at
144-45. The Coast Guard, operating as part of the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity, also performed well. "Although the Coast Guard had only 45,000 uniformed and
civilian employees, they outshone the National Guard, FEMA, the Red Cross, and
everybody else rolled into one" and evacuated some 35,000 people. BRINKLEY, Supra
note 11, at 213-14.
211 FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 132.
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aster or the usurping of state authority."212 Instead, while "a push sys-
tem is a proactive response by the federal government, it still requires
notification and full coordination with the state."2 13 So too, the White
House in its report urges greater provision in the National Response
Plan for a federal push of resources214 and for a unified command
within the federal response structure. 215 At the same time, that report
is also careful to limit federal initiatives: while "Americans have the
right to expect that the Federal government will effectively respond to
a catastrophic incident," the report notes, "the Federal government
cannot and should not be the Nation's first responder. ' 216 Accord-
ingly, the proper "culture of preparedness," will involve "partnership[ s]
among all levels of government," with local government responsible
for mounting the immediate response to "the vast majority of inci-
dents" and state governors required to meet their "sovereign responsi-
bilities to protect their residents." 21 7 Only in a "catastrophic event"
should the federal government share in these obligations.
218
D. Security
In the aftermath of Katrina, there was looting and violent crimes
were committed against residents of affected communities, particu-
larly New Orleans, and against emergency response personnel. 219
(There were also some reports of police officers themselves engaged
in looting stores. 220 ) Historian Douglas Brinkley reports that "[a]ll
sense of law was expunged from New Orleans within hours of the hur-
ricane's passing .... With gangs and crime a way of life at the best of
times in New Orleans, renegades continued coming out in large num-
bers."22 1 Lawlessness delayed and interfered with relief efforts.
222
212 Id. at 136.
213 Id.
214 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 52.
215 See id. at 52, 70.
216 Id. at 52.
217 Id. at 81.
218 Id.
219 See Walt Philbin, Widespread Looting Hits Abandoned Businesses, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Aug. 30, 2005, at A19. Some initial reports proved exaggerated. Rob-
ert E. Pierre & Ann Gerhart, News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid, WASH. POST,
Oct. 5, 2005, at A8.
220 See BRINKLEY, supra note 11, at 361-63.
221 Id. at 362.
222 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 57 ("[L]awlessness in New Orleans signifi-
cantly impeded-and in some cases temporarily halted-relief efforts and delayed
restoration of essential private sector services such as power, water, and telecommuni-
cations."); Associated Press, New Orleans Mayor Order Looting Crackdown, MSNBC.coM,
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In addition to the National Guard,22 3 law enforcement personnel
from other states and federal officers were important to restoring
security in New Orleans. 224 By September 3, some 1600 federal law
enforcement personnel were in New Orleans. 225 Following a request
on September 4 by the Louisiana governor under the Emergency Fed-
eral Law Enforcement Assistance Act,226 additional federal law
enforcement personnel were dispatched. 227 Federal law enforcement
personnel on the scene included officers from the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Vet-
erans' Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Postal
Inspection Service; their work included protecting federal property
and providing assistance to local law enforcement.2 28 Other cities and
states also sent law enforcement personnel. For example, the New
York Police Department (NYPD) contributed 300 officers to restore
order in New Orleans.229 However, the use of law enforcement per-
sonnel from other jurisdictions was not entirely smooth. It required
officers from different jurisdictions, with different rules and policies-
for example, on the use of force-to figure out on the spot how to
work together.230 Federalism also created some more basic problems:
Louisiana and Mississippi insisted on deputizing federal law enforce-
ment officers or swearing them in as peace officers under state law on
the ground that they would be enforcing state laws.23 1 In Louisiana
this process was especially cumbersome because a state police attorney
needed to be present to swear in federal agents.
2 3 2
Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9063708/ (describing how police
officers stopped rescue efforts to respond to looting).
223 See infra Part II.E.
224 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 249-53.
225 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 40-41.
226 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501-10513 (2000).
227 LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 43, at 41.
228 FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 252-56, 397-416; LESSONS LEARNED,
supra note 43, at 41.
229 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 127.
230 See id. at 58. The White House concludes that while the deployment of federal
law enforcement helped to restore order, "it was clear that Federal law enforcement
support to State and local officials required greater coordination, unity of command,
collaborative planning and training with State and local law enforcement, as well as
detailed implementation guidance." Id. Among the White House's recommenda-
tions for improving the national response to emergencies are proposals for greater
federal control and deployment of security personnel. See id. at 88, 102-04.
231 FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 256-57; LESSONS LEARNED, supra note
43, at 41.
232 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 58.
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E. The Role of the Military
During Katrina, impressive numbers of active duty military and
National Guard personnel performed both emergency relief and
security functions. State active duty and Title 32 National Guard units
in Louisiana and Mississippi operated under the command of the gov-
ernors of those states. 23 3 By September 3, 22,000 National Guard
soldiers and airmen were activated; within the week more than 50,000
Guardsmen from forty-nine states were deployed to the region
through EMAC.23 4 Title 10 active duty forces operated under the
command of the President: 14,232 were in the region by September
5.235 U.S. Army soldiers assisted state and local officials with medical
treatment, debris clearing, evacuation, and search and rescue; the
Marine Corps helped with search and rescue and rebuilding infra-
structure; the U.S. Navy provided equipment; and the U.S. Air Force
provided recovery and relief services.
236
However, the use of these different forces also produced
problems of coordination. 237 Separate command structures for the
active duty military and National Guard forces under state control hin-
dered joint operations and produced duplicate efforts. 238 The
National Guard did not have adequate knowledge of DOD plans and
procedures; 239 FEMA at times requested assistance from DOD without
knowing that state forces had been deployed to fill the same needs;
2 40
and confusion about the status and proper functions of the various
National Guard units caused delay. 241 National Guard personnel were
also not properly trained to perform tasks asked of them-in particu-
lar, dealing with large numbers of civilians at the Superdome and
other refuges. 2 42 The failure of DOD and state officials fo have
engaged in joint planning and training for emergencies exacerbated
233 Under Title 32 status, National Guard troops remain under the control of the
state's governor but are paid with federal funds. Because they are under state control
they can perform law enforcement functions. Id. at 42 & n.147.
234 Id. at 202; PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 163, at 62.
235 LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 43, at 43.
236 See id. at 131.
237 See id. at 43 (reporting that despite the "critical" contributions of these military
personnel, "[a] fragmented deployment system and lack of an integrated command
structure for both active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated communica-
tions and coordination issues during the initial response").
238 FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 201, 219; LESSONs LEARNED, supra note
43, at 55.
239 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 219.
240 See LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 43, at 55.
241 FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 229.
242 See id. at 230.
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the federal-state tension. 243 There were also some very practical obsta-
cles: National Guard, active duty military, and state and local emer-
gency responders lacked interoperable communications equipment
and other devices. 2
44
In sum, federalism meant there was a dual military response
rather than an integrated response. 245 Though this was quickly
understood to be a problem, it was not easy to overcome. 246 Gover-
nors of the Gulf States refused to relinquish command of National
Guard units in their states. 247 On September 2, 2005, the White
House presented Governor Blanco with a proposal for a "Mutually
Exclusive Chain of Command," under which a single commander
would have "dual status" as chief of the Louisiana National Guard-
subject to the Governor's orders-and of federal troops (including
federalized National Guard units); the commander would be loyal to
both the President and the Governor. 248 Blanco refused the propo-
sal. 249 When the White House sought to establish unified command
over police and state National Guard units in Louisiana, state officials
also rejected that proposal as akin to martial law.250
F. Summary
Katrina demonstrated the shortcomings of existing governmental
emergency response plans and procedures within our federal system.
Chief among these problems is the difficulty of producing an ade-
quate response when governmental functions are divided. The
remainder of the Article sets forth a solution.
III. SAVING FEDERALISM FROM ITSELF
Emergencies are not a new kind of problem. The Americans who
wrote and ratified the Federal Constitution understood that emergen-
cies would arise that would require a governmental response. The rat-
ifying generation also understood that some emergencies would
overwhelm the capacities of local and state government, and require
243 See id. at 222.
244 See id. at 226-28; LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 43.
245 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 222.
246 See, e.g., PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 163, at 64 ("National Guard and
active duty troops provide critical resources, but improved coordination with FEMA is
needed to ensure adequate support.").
247 See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 221.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 483 (supplementary report of Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney).
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national assistance. In particular, if security broke down and states
were unable to maintain control, the national government would play
a critical role in mustering and deploying the necessary resources to
restore order. At the same time, the members of the ratifying genera-
tion were committed to federalism: while there is an important role
for the national government during emergencies, it should not simply
displace local and state governments.
The result of these considerations was that the 1789 Constitution
gave the national government responsibility and authority to respond
to emergencies; in particular, security threats. However, the Constitu-
tion tied the national government's response to its use of state
resources. Avoiding the need for a large standing army under
national control, the Constitution permitted the federal government
to commandeer, on a temporary basis, state militiamen in order to
deal with three general kinds of emergencies involving security con-
cerns: invasions, insurrections, and organized opposition to federal
law. This Part considers those constitutional provisions and how,
implemented with legislation, they provided the basis for the new
national government to respond to a variety of emergencies. Under-
standing the constitutional provisions for emergency commandeering
and their historical uses reveals how the national government today
can deploy state and local resources when emergencies arise.
A. Constitutional Provisions
The Framers of the Constitution understood that in a federal sys-
tem of government, in which power is divided and dispersed, special
attention needs to be given to matters of security. Shays' Rebellion,
on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, demonstrated that there
would come times when states would be unable to take care of their
own security needs-and that a threat in one state could easily spill
over into other states and affect the nation as a whole. 251 Under the
Articles of Confederation, however, Congress had no authority to
intervene to protect a state (and lacked the resources in any event).
The states pledged in the Articles "to assist each other, against all
force," 252 but there was no provision to enforce the requirement, no
provision by which a troubled state could demand the assistance of its
neighbors.
By widespread agreement, some mechanism was needed in the
new Constitution by which outside resources could be brought into an
251 See generallyJason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REv. 29, 47-49
(2005) (discussing Shays' Rebellion and its importance in the period of ratification).
252 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. III (U.S. 1781).
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individual state to maintain security. 25 3 Simply relying on other states
to come voluntarily to the assistance of a troubled state was not a real-
istic solution because states far from a trouble spot had little incentive
to deploy their personnel and resources. As Alexander Hamilton
identified the issue, "While danger is distant, its impression is weak;
and while it affects only our neighbors, we have few motives to provide
against it.' '254 Memories of how some states had borne a dispropor-
tionate burden in the Revolutionary War made this problem clear.
25 5
One approach, in a federal system of government, is to assign the
entire responsibility for security to the national government and make
sure it has sufficient resources to get the job done. This solution
bypasses the states and thereby avoids the reluctance of state govern-
ments to participate in security beyond their own borders or their own
interests. At the Philadelphia Convention, and at the state ratifying
conventions, centralization of security powers was a constant
theme. 256 The Federalist also presented lengthy arguments in favor of
augmenting national authority to provide security from both foreign
and domestic threats.
257
Yet simply centralizing security raises other problems. Chief
among these to the ratifying generation was the threat nationalized
security powers poses to liberty. For Americans of the 1780s, who
253 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 231-32 (photo. reprint 1996) (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B.
Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
254 Id. at 232 (reporting the statements of Alexander Hamilton before the Con-
vention of the State of New York on June 17, 1788).
255 See id. at 231-32 (discussing the disproportionate burden of the state of New
York); id. at 343-44 (reporting the statement of Robert Livingston making a similar
point).
256 When the Philadelphia Convention got underway with Edmund Randolph
enumerating the defects in the Articles of Confederation and presenting the Virginia
Plan, he began with the problem of maintaining security. SeeJAMES MADISON, NOTES
OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 29-30 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio
Univ. Press 1984) (1840) (noting "1. that the confederation produced no security
against foreign invasion .... 2. that the federal government could not check quarrels
between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to
interpose according to the exigency"); id. at 29 ("The Character of [the new federal]
government ought to secure 1. against foreign invasions: 2. against dissentions
between members of the Union, or seditions in particular states .... ").
257 See THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 21 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(explaining how a strong national government will "apply the resources and power of
the whole to the defence of any particular part"); id. No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), at
149 (arguing in favor of making the national government "the guardian of the com-
mon safety"); id. (explaining that the national government will "make suitable provi-
sions for the public defence" because it is the "representative of the WHOLE" and so
"will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part").
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knew all about abuses by Redcoats, the particular incarnation of the
threat was the standing national army: professional soldiers, under the
command of a national government, interfering with the rights of the
people in the name of maintaining law and order.258 In contrast to
the militia-members of the local community, operating under local
control-security powers in the hands of a national government and
its professional soldiers risked tyranny.
These competing concerns-the need to ensure adequate secur-
ity, but the fear of centralized power-resulted in constitutional provi-
sions that struck a balance. Article I of the Constitution gives
Congress powers to "declare War," "raise and support Armies," "pro-
vide and maintain a Navy," and "make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces. '259 The Constitution also
authorizes Congress to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions"
and to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Ser-
vice of the United States," while "reserving to the States . . . the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."260 Article II
makes the President "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States."261 Article IV confers pos-
itive obligations on the federal government to "guarantee" the states
"a Republican Form of Government" and to "protect" each state
"against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domes-
tic Violence." 26
2
Together, these provisions represent a means of providing secur-
ity, while avoiding an undue concentration of security powers. The
Constitution assigns the federal government an obligatory security
role: Article IV makes the federal government responsible for protect-
ing the states from invasions. The national government is also
required to protect states from domestic violence when the states ask
for help. A state that faces a security threat is therefore not depen-
258 See generally Bernard Donahoe & Marshall Smelser, The Congressional Power to
Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions, 1787-1788, 33 REv. POL. 202
(1971) (describing the dispute during the constitutional ratification process concern-
ing the inclusion and scope of Congress' power "to raise and support armies").
259 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
260 Id.
261 Id. art. II, § 2.
262 Id. art. IV, § 4.
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dent for aid on the good will of other states. In fulfilling its security
obligations, the national government can either deploy federal troops
or call into federal service militia units. While the national govern-
ment has power to create and maintain armed forces, as a check on
the need to maintain a large standing army, the Constitution autho-
rizes the national government to call into periods of federal service
the militia of the states, under the President's command. Federalists
emphasized over and over how the availability of the militia would
prevent the need for a standing army and protect liberties.
2 63
In addition to repelling invasions and suppressing insurrections,
the national government is authorized to use the militia for a third
purpose: to "execute the Laws" of the United States. 264 What does
that mean? Article II requires that the President "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." 265 Read together, these two provisions
might suggest that Congress can authorize the President to deploy the
militia in the course of putting into effect any and all federal laws:
militiamen could be required to serve as postal clerks, tax collectors,
customs inspectors, and all of the other agents of the federal bureau-
cracy. A more likely understanding is that the militia can be called
into federal service not to carry out federal law in the first instance,
but in response to situations where federal laws are being resisted:
when the implementation of federal laws is opposed with violence.
When militiamen are armed and trained according to congressional
specifications, they are prepared for a security role; reading these pro-
visions in the context of other Article I grounds for calling forth the
militia (to repel invasions and suppress insurrections) also suggests
that executing the laws of the Union has a security flavor. Further,
Article II itself suggests that the normal mechanism will be for federal
civil officers to enforce the laws: the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of
the United States." 266 Those commissioned officers, distinct from the
263 See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 253, at 381 (reporting the statement of
James Madison before the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on June 14,
1788) ("The most effectual way to guard against a standing army, is to render it
unnecessary. The most effectual way to render it unnecessary, is to give the general
government full power to call forth the militia. .. ."); THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexan-
der Hamilton), supra note 257, at 184-85 (stating that the militia is "the only substi-
tute that can be devised for a standing army; [and] the best possible security against it,
if it should exist"); id. No. 46 (James Madison), at 321 (arguing that given the option
of calling forth the militia, the federal government would never need an army bigger
than 30,000 men).
264 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
265 Id. art. II, § 3.
266 Id.
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militia, 267 are the people who will ordinarily administer federal laws.
The militia will intervene only to overcome opposition.
Evidence from the Virginia ratifying convention supports this
interpretation. On June 14, 1788, General Green Clay asked "to be
informed why the Congress were to have power to provide for calling
forth the militia, to put the laws of the Union into execution."
268
James Madison's explanation focused on the provision as limited to
implementing federal laws that have generated opposition and resis-
tance on the ground-Congress' power was not a general power to
use the militia to carry out all federal programs, but rather was closely
tied to suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions. Madison
stated:
If resistance should be made to the execution of the laws . . . it
ought to be overcome. This could be done only in two ways-either
by regular forces or by the people .... If insurrections should arise,
or invasions should take place, the people ought unquestionably to
be employed, to suppress and repel them, rather than a standing
army. The best way to do these things was to put the militia on a
good and sure footing, and enable the government to make use of
their services when necessary.
269
The militia, Madison noted, would only be called forth to execute the
laws when "resistance to the laws required it" because the sheriffs
"posse ... were insufficient to overcome the resistance to the execu-
tion of the laws." 270 Where, however, "the civil power was sufficient,"
the use of the militia "would never be put in practice." 271 On the
other hand, Madison observed that in order to make use of the militia
to execute federal laws, resistance did not have to rise to the level of
an invasion or insurrection: "There are cases in which the execution
of the laws may require the operation of militia, which cannot be said
to be an invasion or insurrection. There may be a resistance to the
laws which cannot be termed an insurrection. ' 272 For example, "a riot
d[oes] not come within the legal definition of an insurrection. There
might be riots, to oppose the execution of the laws, which the civil
267 The states retain the power to appoint officers of the militia even when called
into federal service. Id. art. I, § 8.
268 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 253, at 378 (reporting the statement of General
Green Clay before the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on June 14,
1788).
269 Id. at 378 (reporting the statement ofJames Madison before the Convention of
the Commonwealth of Virginia on June 14, 1788).
270 Id. at 384.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 408.
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power might not be sufficient to quell." 273 The point was hammered
home in response to Patrick Henry's concerns. Henry argued that
because it made no specific provision for Congress to use civil powers
to enforce federal laws, the Constitution dangerously allowed for the
use of military powers in the first instance. 274 George Nicholas
offered a rebuttal. The Constitution, Nicholas argued, did not say
"the civil power shall not be employed," and therefore it did not alter
the normal governmental practice that "[t]he civil officer is to execute
the laws on all occasions." 275 If, however, the laws were "resisted, this
auxiliary power is given to Congress of calling forth the militia to exe-
cute them, when it shall be found absolutely necessary." 276 Edmund
Randolph, agreeing with Nicholas' interpretation, stressed the need
for "common sense [as] the rule of interpreting this Constitution.
'" 277
Since there was no "exclusion of civil power," or a suggestion "that the
laws are to be enforced by military coercion in all cases," the proper
inference was that "when the civil power is not sufficient, the militia
must be drawn out."
278
B. Statutory Provisions
In accordance with these constitutional provisions, the early Con-
gress put in place the statutory mechanisms for national comman-
deering of militiamen in order to respond to emergencies in any part
of the country. Congress specified how militiamen were to be trained
and equipped and the circumstances under which they could be
called into federal service. In the ensuing decades, in responding to
emergencies-including defending frontiers, putting down insurrec-
tions, and quelling opposition to federal laws-the national govern-
ment regularly relied upon state militiamen, who served with
compensation under temporary federal command. Reconstruction-
era statutes, built upon these early laws, provided the basis for the
national government to quell violence in the South and enforce feder-
ally protected rights.
2 79
273 Id. at 410.
274 See id. at 387 (reporting the statements of Patrick Henry before the Convention
of the Commonwealth of Virginia on June 14, 1788).
275 Id. at 392 (reporting the statements of George Nicholas before the Convention
of the Commonwealth of Virginia on June 14, 1788).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 400 (reporting the statements of Edmund Randolph before the Conven-
tion of the Commonwealth of Virginia on June 14, 1788).
278 Id.
279 The history is not all rosy. Federalists argued that the Militia Clause of Article I
and the Protection Clause of Article IV gave Congress power to pass the 1798 Sedition
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1. Early Statutes
On May 2, 1792, Congress enacted the first general authorization
for federal use of the militia, entitled "An act to provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrec-
tions and repel invasions." 28 0 The statute set out procedures for the
President to call forth the militia in accordance with the three uses
permitted under Article I of the Constitution.2 1I The Act authorized
the President, in times of "imminent danger of invasion . .. to call
forth such number of the militia of the state or states most convenient
to the place of danger or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to
repel such invasion." 282 In the event of an insurrection, the Act
authorized the President, upon application by the affected state, "to
call forth such number of militia of any other state or states, as may be
applied for, or as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrec-
tion."283 The Act also authorized the President to deploy militiamen
"whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the exe-
cution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful
to be suppressed by the ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings, or by
the powers vested in the [federal] marshals." 28 4 Before the militia
could be used for this purpose, the Act required that a district judge
or a Supreme Court Justice certify that this condition existed. 28 5 In
using the militia to execute federal laws, the President was first
required to call forth the militia of the state in which the obstruction
to the laws existed: if that state's militia refused to comply or was inef-
fective, the President could call forth militia from other states, but
only if Congress was not in session to respond to the problem and
only until thirty days after Congress resumed its session. 286 Before any
federal deployment of the militia, the President was also required to
issue an order directing insurgents to disperse. 28 7 Federal service was
limited to periods of three months per year, with militiamen paid at
the same rate as regular troops. 288
Act. See 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2985-92 (1799) (setting out arguments in favor of the
Act).
280 Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (repealed 1795).
281 See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
282 Act of May 2, 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. at 264.
283 Id.
284 Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 264.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 264.
288 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 264.
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Six days after Congress put in place the first statutory mechanisms
for the President to call forth the militia, Congress passed "An Act
more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing
an Uniform Militia throughout the United States." 28 9 This statute
implemented Congress' powers to "provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia."290 For more than a century, this was the
only federal statute under which the militia was organized. The Act
enrolled every "free able-bodied white male citizen" between the ages
of eighteen and forty-five in the militia company "within whose
bounds such citizen shall reside. '" 291 Congress therefore believed it
was entitled to define, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, who
comprised the militia (rather than defer to the practices of the states),
a point that will become important when we consider the modern
applications of the Constitution's militia clauses. 292 Much of the inter-
nal organization of militia units was left up to the states. Congress
specified that the militia was to be "arranged into divisions, brigades,
regiments, battalions and companies, as the legislature of each state
shall direct. '293 The Act required militiamen to equip themselves with
muskets, bayonets, and other gear.294 Because the requirement that
militiamen furnish their own arms and equipment proved impractical,
Congress soon enacted programs for lending out arms, 29 5 for purchas-
ing and reselling arms to the states for their militiamen to use,296 and
eventually equipped the militia itself.29 7
Two additional early statutes bear mentioning. On February 28,
1795, Congress reenacted the May 2, 1792 statute but removed two of
289 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903).
290 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
291 Act of May 8, 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. at 271.
292 Though, perhaps questioning its own authority in this regard, or concerned
about the ability to enforce its definition, Congress did allow the states to exempt
classes of individuals from militia service. Id. § 2, 1 Star. at 272.
293 Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 272.
294 Id. § 1, 1 Star. at 271.
295 Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47, § 12, 1 Stat. 558, 560 (repealed 1802) (authorizing
militia called into federal service to borrow arms and artillery from federal arsenals,
with "proper receipts and security" and acceptance of responsibility for "the accidents
of ... service").
296 Act ofJuly 6, 1798, ch. 65, §§ 1-2, 1 Star. 576, 576 (appropriating $400,000 for
the purchase of 30,000 stands of arms, to be made available for sale to the states and
their militia-with unsold arms available for borrowing by militiamen called into fed-
eral service).
297 Act of Apr. 23, 1808, ch. 55, §§ 1-3, 2 Stat. 490, 490-91 (appropriating
$200,000 annually to purchase arms for distribution to the states in proportion to
their militia enrollments).
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its restrictions on the President's powers. 298 The new law eliminated
the requirement that a district judge or Supreme CourtJustice certify
that there existed opposition to the laws. 299 The new law also
removed the provision that permitted the President to call forth mili-
tia from other states only if the Congress was not in session.3° ° On
March 3, 1807, upon a request by Jefferson in the wake of the Burr
conspiracy, 301 Congress also authorized the use of regulars to respond




In response to increasing violence by the Ku Klux Klan and the
inability or unwillingness of local authorities to stop it, on April 20,
1871, Congress passed the "Act to enforce the Provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for
other Purposes."30 3 Among other things, this statute, known as the Ku
Klux Klan Act, authorized the use of troops and the militia to enforce
federal rights. 30 4 Congress could point to two sources of authority to
enact this statutory provision. The Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress specific power to enforce its terms by "appropriate legisla-
tion."305 Consistent with the early understandings of Article I, Con-
gress could also provide for the deployment of the militia to suppress
insurrections and enforce federal laws that were opposed.
30 6
298 Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and current ver-
sion at 10 U.S.C.A §§ 331-335 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007)).
299 Id. § 2.
300 Id.
301 See generally Mazzone, supra note 251, at 114-16 (discussing the Burr conspir-
acy and the passage of the March 3, 1807 statute).
302 Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443, 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331, 335 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007)).
303 Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. In United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), the Supreme Court invalidated as exceeding Congress'
powers section 2 of the Act, which outlawed conspiracies to deprive persons of rights
or privileges protected under state law. Id. at 644.
304 See Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act § 3, 17 Stat. at 14.
305 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION,
1863-1877, at 454-56 (1988) (describing the debates over Congress' power to pass
the statute).
306 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 72-73 (1871) (reporting
arguments by Michigan Representative Austin Blair in favor of the Act on these
grounds). The statute also authorized the President to suspend habeas corpus. See Ku
Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act § 4, 17 Stat. at 14-15.
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C. The Militia and the Posse-Executive Interpretations
At two moments, straddling the Civil War, and each involving
issues of race, the executive branch issued important interpretations
of the federal power to use the militia. The first was the enforcement
of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850; the second, the quelling of violence
during Reconstruction.
1. Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act
Part of the Compromise of 1850 and signed into law by President
Millard Fillmore,30 7 the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850308 created local
commissioners, appointed by the U.S. circuit courts, to assist in the
recapture of runaway slaves. 30 9 Under the Act, a slave owner could
obtain a certificate for the return of a fugitive slave upon simple proof
of ownership to the commissioner or to a federal judge.3 1 0 Once the
certificate issued, the U.S. marshal was required to ensure return of
the slave to the owner.3 1 1 The Act also authorized the commissioner,
or federal judge, to call out the posse comitatus to assist the mar-
shal.31 2 In addition, the Act punished individuals who helped slaves
escape.
31 3
Though the Fugitive Slave Act faced tremendous opposition in
the North, President Fillmore took the position that, as President, he
was duty bound to enforce the Act.31 4 Fillmore also asserted that
under the Constitution he had inherent power (without the need for
congressional authorization) to use the military to enforce the law.
3 15
Hence, in February 1851, after a Boston mob freed the fugitive slave
Shadrach and sent him to Canada, the Secretary of War directed the
Boston commander to be ready to provide troops to aid in the recap-
ture of Shadrach should the marshal present a certificate in accor-
dance with the 1850 Act.3 16 Fillmore also issued a proclamation in
which he called on "all well-disposed citizens to rally to the support of
307 ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY TAYLOR AND MILLARD FILLMORE
185-89, 195 (1988).
308 Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864).
309 Id. § 1, 9 Stat. at 462.
310 Id. § 6, 9 Stat. at 463.
311 Id. § 5, 9 Stat. at 462.
312 Id.
313 Id. § 7, 9 Stat. at 464.
314 SMITH, supra note 307, at 239-41 (reporting on Fillmore's consistent efforts to
enforce the Act).
315 See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC
DISoDERS, 1789-1878, at 128-30 (1988).
316 Id. at 129.
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the laws of their country" and "command[ed] all officers, civil and
military, and all other persons, civil or military... within the vicinity
of this outrage" to "aid[ ] and assist[ ] by all means in their power in
quelling this and other such combinations and assisting the marshal
and his deputies in recapturing the .. .prisoner [Shadrach]. '"317
In response to a Senate request for information about the inci-
dent, Fillmore replied with a strong assertion of executive power:
"[S] o far as depends on me, the laws shall be faithfully executed, and
all forcible opposition to them suppressed; and to this end I am pre-
pared to exercise, whenever it may become necessary, the power con-
stitutionally vested in me, to the fullest extent."3 18 Fillmore conceded
that deployment of the militia needed to conform to congressional
legislation, including the 1795 Militia Act.3 1 9 On the other hand, he
stated, because "the army and navy are, by the [C]onstitution, placed
under the control of the Executive," the President was entitled to
deploy regulars to enforce federal law as he saw fit.3 20 Moreover, Fill-
more claimed, "[A]Ill citizens, whether enrolled in the militia or not,
may be summoned as members of the posse comitatus, either by the
marshal or a commissioner, according to law, and ... it is their duty to
obey such summons."32 1 The only thing that "may be doubted" was
"whether the marshal or a commissioner can summon as the posse
comitatus an organized militia force, acting under its own appropriate
officers, without the consent of such officers." 32 2 Fillmore suggested
that "[t]his point may deserve the consideration of Congress."
323
The Senate Judiciary Committee, though saying nothing about
inherent executive authority to use regulars, took a broad view of the
reach of the power of the U.S. marshals to summon the posse comita-
tus. 324 The posse comitatus, the committee concluded, included regu-
317 Millard Fillmore, Proclamation of Feb. 18, 1851, reprinted in 5 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 109, 110 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1899) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS], available at http://www.
gutenberg.org/files/10951/10951-h/10951-h.htm.
318 Millard Fillmore, Statement to the Senate of the United States (Feb. 21, 1851),
inJouRNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 203, 207 (1851), availa-
ble at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsjlink.html (follow "31st, 1849-51"
hyperlink; then follow "Second Session: December 2, 1850 to March 3, 1851"
hyperlink).
319 See id. at 206.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 207.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 See S. REP. No. 31-320, at 1 (1852) (reporting on the message of the President
on the case of forcible resistance to the execution of the laws in Boston).
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lars and the militia. "Because men are soldiers or sailors," the
committee reasoned, "they cease not to be citizens; and while acting
under the call and direction of the civil authority, they may act with
more efficiency, and without objection, in an organized form, under
appropriate subordinate command." 25 In other words, marshals had
authority to use the posse comitatus to enforce civil law; the posse
comitatus included the local men who were also members of the
armed forces and the militia. In addition, the committee noted,
under the 1795 and 1807 Acts, should federal laws be opposed, the
President can call forth the militia and regulars.
326
Two years later, the Judiciary Committee's view took concrete
effect. In May 1854, abolitionists in Boston made repeated efforts to
rescue Anthony Burns to prevent his return under the Fugitive Slave
Act to his Virginia owner.327 With the approval of President Franklin
Pierce, the U.S. marshal in Boston requested and obtained regular
troops to aid local militia forces in preventing Burns' rescue and
maintaining order in the city.328 Attorney General Caleb Cushing
issued an opinion setting out the legal basis for the marshal to use
militia units and regulars to carry out federal law.329 Tracking the
Senate Committee's earlier understanding of the powers of federal
marshals, Cushing explained:
A Marshal of the United States, when opposed in the execution
of his duty, by unlawful combinations, has authority, to summon the
entire ablebodied force of his precinct, as a posse comitatus.
The authority comprehends, not only bystanders and other citi-
zens generally, but any and all organized armed force, whether mili-
325 Id.
326 See id. Small contingents of federal troops were used on occasion to quell slave
riots, including in New Orleans, Louisiana; Norfolk, Virginia; and Newbern, North
Carolina during periods of agitation in the spring and summer of 1831. See COAKLEV,
supra note 315, at 92-94.
327 See generally ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BuRNs 63-68,
207-19 (1999) (describing failed attempts to free Burns).
328 See COAKLrv, supra note 315, at 134.
329 See 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466 (1854). Cushing's opinion departed from the "Mans-
field Doctrine," the name given to the opinion of Lord ChiefJustice Mansfield, in the
context of the London riots of 1780, that civil disturbances should be quelled by civil
authorities and the posse comitatus, not by military authorities, and that even if
soldiers comprised the posse comitatus, they should be deemed to be acting in a civil
capacity and therefore subject to civilian laws. See generally David Engdahl, Soldiers,
Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 49-51 (1971) (explaining that Cushing departed from about seventy years of
acceptance of the Mansfield Doctrine in America).
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tia of the State, or officers, soldiers, sailors, and marines of the
United States.3"'
According to this approach, the marshal, charged under the 1789
Judiciary Act with enforcing federal law, 33 1 need not even consult the
President before using regulars and the militia as part of the posse
comitatus.
2. Reconstruction Violence
In its efforts to quell violence during Reconstruction, the execu-
tive branch affirmed that a U.S. marshal could call on the assistance of
militia units and regulars as part of the posse comitatus, but set limits
on the circumstances in which the marshal could exercise this author-
ity. On August 20, 1868, in response to a request from the marshal in
the Northern District of Florida for military assistance, Attorney Gen-
eral William M. Evarts set out the circumstances under which a mar-
shal could call on regulars and militiamen.33 2 Citing the 1789
Judiciary Act, Evarts thought that a marshal had broad power to call
for help in carrying out his duties: "[T] he only measure of the assis-
tance which you have power to command is its necessity for the execu-
tion of your duty, and upon your discreet judgment under your
official responsibility, the law reposes the determination of what force
each particular necessity requires."333 The power of a marshal, Evarts
explained, was "equivalent to that of a sheriff,"334 and therefore
included "as a resort in necessity, the whole power of the precinct
(county or district) over which the officer's authority extends."
33 5
Evarts therefore adopted Cushing's view that this "power of the pre-
cinct" reached "'every person in the district or county above the age of
15 years, whether civilians or not, hnd including the military of all
330 6 Op. Att'y Gen. at 466; see also id. at 473 ("[T] he posse comitatus comprises
every person in the district or county above the age of fifteen years... including the
military of all denominations, militia, soldiers, marines, all of whom are alike bound
to obey the commands of a sheriff or marshal.").
331 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (stating that the marshal
has the duty "to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him,
and issued under the authority of the United States, and he shall have power to com-
mand all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty, and to appoint as there
shall be occasion, one or more deputies").
332 FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES: 1787-1903, S.
Doc. No. 67-263, at 104-05 (1922) [hereinafter FEDERAL AID] (quoting letter from
William M. Evarts, U.S. Attorney Gen., to the U.S. Marshal of the N. Dist. Fla. (Aug.
20, 1868)).
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denominations-militia, soldiers, marines-all of whom are alike
bound to obey the commands of a sheriff or marshal.'" 3 3 6 However,
Evarts stated that a marshal should not "confound [ I]" his "special duty
and authority" in the execution of process 33 7 with the more general
"duty and authority of suppressing disorder and preserving the peace,
which ... belongs to the civil authorities of the States."33 8 Nor should
a marshal confuse his role with
the authority and duty of the President... in the specific cases of
the Constitution and under the regulations of the statutes, to pro-
tect the States against domestic violence, or with his authority and
duty, under special statutes to employ military force in subduing
combinations in resistance to the laws of the United States.
3 39
In the absence of any specific direction from the President, Evarts
stated, these functions are not "shared by the subordinate officers of
the Government" like marshals.3 40 According to Evarts, these specifi-
cations and divisions of power operated to permit a military response
where necessary while safeguarding liberty.3 41 So too, following dis-
turbances in New Orleans, on September 1, 1868, the commander for
the District of Louisiana, General Robert C. Buchanan, acting on
instructions from Ulysses Grant, issued orders broadly defining the
role the military could play in dealing with resistance to the law.
3 42
According to Buchanan, a sheriff had authority to call on troops as
part of the posse comitatus to deal with opposition to state law; a fed-




Federal law defines the militia and authorizes the President to
call it forth. According to Title 10 of the U.S. Code:
The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied
males at least 17 years of age and ... under 45 years of age who are,
or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of
336 Id. (quoting Attorney General Cushing).
337 Id.
338 Id. at 104-05.
339 Id. at 105.
340 Id.
341 See id.
342 Id. at 122-23 (quoting Circular No. 2, Department of Lousiana, New Orleans
(Sept. 1, 1868)).
343 See id. However, the military commander should determine whether any
request for the assistance of troops was necessary. See id.
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the United States and of female citizens of the United States who
are members of the National Guard.
3 44
The militia is divided into the "organized militia," consisting of the
National Guard and the Naval Militia, and the "unorganized militia,"
which includes everyone else.3 45 The law provides exemption from
militia service for active duty members of the armed forces and gov-
ernment officials and religion-based exemptions from combat.
346
Under Title 10, the President is authorized to call into federal service
militia units in response to a state's request for assistance in sup-
pressing an insurrection. 347 The President can also deploy the militia
along with regulars, to suppress obstructions to the enforcement of
federal law (without the need for any request from a state) .348
In October 2006, as part of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,' 49 Congress made some impor-
tant modifications to the President's powers to use military force to
protect Fourteenth Amendment rights. Prior to these changes, fed-
eral statutory law, originating in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and
codified in § 333 of Title 10, required the President to take actions,
including the use of the militia and armed forces, to suppress insur-
rections within states that interfered with Fourteenth Amendment
rights and to ensure the execution of federal laws. 350 The October
2006 amendments to § 333, with the subtitle "Use of the Armed
344 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2000); see also id. § 101(c)(2), (4) (specifying that the
"Army National Guard" and the "Air National Guard" refers to "that part of the organ-
ized militia of the several States and Territories, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia" that is a land (or air) force; trained and with officers appointed in accor-
dance with the Militia Clauses of the Constitution; is organized, armed, and equipped
at federal expense; and is federally recognized); 32 U.S.C. § 101(4), (6) (2000)
(same).
345 10 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2000).
346 See id. § 312(b).
347 See id. § 331. The modern statute grows out of a series of earlier laws: Calling
Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795); Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1
Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and current version at 10 U.S.C.A §§ 331-335 (West
1998 & Supp. 2007)); Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at
10 U.S.C.A §§ 331-335 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007)); Suppression of the Rebellion Act
of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (current version at 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-335 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2007)); and parts of the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3-4,
17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (expired in part in 1873 and current version at 10 U.S.C.A. § 333
(West Supp. 2007)). The Justice Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 10501 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2007) and implementing regulations also authorize federal law enforcement
assistance to the states upon their written request.
348 10 U.S.C.A § 332 (West Supp. 2007).
349 109 Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006).
350 See Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871, ch.22, §3, 17 Stat 13, 14.
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Forces in Major Public Emergencies," added, as a basis for the Presi-
dent to intervene, the need to restore order following an emer-
gency. 351 The amended § 333, reproduced here as a footnote, 352 also
appears to work some other significant changes. The original § 333
required the President to take action;353 the new version simply grants
authorization.354 The original section allowed the President to call
351 See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
§ 1076, 120 Stat. at 2404 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333)
352 Section 333 now reads:
(a) Use of Armed Forces in Major Public Emergencies.-(1) The President
may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal ser-
vice, to-
(A) restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States
when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any
State or possession of the United States, the President determines that-
(i) domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the con-
stituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining
public order; and
(ii) such violence results in a condition described in paragraph
(2); or
(B) suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combination, or conspiracy if such insurrection, violation, combination, or
conspiracy results in a condition described in paragraph (2).
(2) A condition described in this paragraph is a condition that-
(A) so hinders the execution of the laws of a State or possession, as
applicable, and of the United States within that State or possession, that any
part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or pro-
tection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted
authorities of that State or possession are unable, fail, or refuse to protect
that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(B) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States
or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
(3) In any situation covered by paragraph (1) (B), the State shall be consid-
ered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the
Constitution.
(b) Notice to Congress-The President shall notify Congress of the determi-
nation to exercise the authority in subsection (a) (1) (A) as soon as practica-
ble after the determination and every 14 days thereafter during the duration
of the exercise of that authority.
Id. §1076, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404-05 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333).
353 Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 15, 15 ("The President... shall take
such measures as he considers necessary to suppress .. .any insurrection .... ).
354 10 U.S.C.A. § 333 (West Supp. 2007) ("The President may employ the armed
forces . . .to .. .suppress .. .any insurrection ....").
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the militia into federal service;3 55 the new version says nothing about
the militia and refers only to "employ[ing] the armed forces, includ-
ing the National Guard in Federal service."
3 56
Title 10 is not the only current provision of the United States
Code dealing with the use of the militia. Still in existence is the law
enacted in the Civil War era allowing the President to declare a state
in insurrection against the United States, prohibit commerce with that
state, and seize goods flowing to and from that state.3 57 Additional
scattered statutory provisions allow for the President to use the militia
in specified circumstances. 35 8 Federal magistrates are also authorized




The Constitution authorizes the federal government to comman-
deer the states' militias and deploy regulars in order to respond to
certain types of emergencies. 360 Beginning with laws passed in the
355 Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. at 15 ("The President, by using the
militia or the armed forces, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he
considers necessary .... ").
356 10 U.S.C.A. § 333 (West Supp. 2007). A comparison with other provisions of
Title 10 suggests that the militia is distinct from the "armed forces." See 10 U.S.C.
§ 331 (2000) (distinguishing the two). Critics of the October 2006 amendment com-
plained that it was inconsistent with federalism to give the President, in times of natu-
ral disasters and other emergencies, increased authority over the National Guard and
power to use the military to restore public order. See 152 CONG. REc. S10,808-10
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy), available at http://leahy.senate.
gov/press/200609/092906b.html (describing as "incredible" the "changes ... [that]
allow the President to use the military, including the National Guard, to carry out law
enforcement activities without the consent of a governor"); David S. Broder, Governors
Wary of Change on Troops, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2006, at A5 (discussing opposition to
the provision among governors). Little attention has been given to how the statute
removes the President's former authority under § 333 to deploy the militia.
357 Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 32, 12 Stat. 284 (1861) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§ 205 (2000)); Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 5, 12 Stat. 255, 257 (1861) (current ver-
sion at 50 U.S.C. § 205 (2000)).
358 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 461-462 (2000) (allowing the use of militia to capture vessels
and to require enemy ships to depart the United States); 50 U.S.C. § 220 (2000)
(authorizing the President to use the militia of the United States to prevent the
release of vessels and cargo detained by customs officers).
359 See 42 U.S.C. § 1989 (2000) (specifying that a magistrate judge is allowed to
appoint an individual to execute process and that individual can "summon and call to
their aid the bystanders or posse comitatus of the proper county, or such portion of
the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as may be necessary to
the performance of the duty with which they are charged").
360 See supra Part III.A.
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earliest years of the Republic, Congress has provided the statutory
mechanisms for the President to call forth and deploy militia units
under federal command and to send regular troops to affected
sites.361 This subpart considers some of the many historical occasions
on which these constitutional and statutory provisions were put into
practice. Well known are the federal government's uses of troops to
implement school desegregation orders in the 1950s and 1960s362 and
to quell modern urban riots.3 63 But these are the tail end of a much
longer history of deploying military force in response to violence.
Recognizing in particular how, from its earliest days, the federal gov-
ernment has relied upon state militia and regulars to suppress opposi-
tion to federal laws lays the groundwork for thinking about the broad
power of the modern federal government to commandeer state per-
sonnel in times of emergency.
3 64
1. Taxes: The Whiskey Rebellion and Fries' Rebellion
Opposition to tax laws during the Whiskey Rebellion in the early
1790s and Fries' Rebellion in 1799 presented the government early
grounds to deploy the militia to enforce federal laws. The underlying
events of the Whiskey Rebellion require only brief recitation.3 65 As
part of Alexander Hamilton's 1790-1791 financial plan, the federal
361 See supra Part III.B.
362 In September 1957, President Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock, Arkansas,
and federalized the state's National Guard. See Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 89
(Supp. 1957). President Kennedy federalized the National Guard and sent troops to
the University of Mississippi in September 1962, see Exec. Order No. 11,053, 3 C.F.R.
254 (Supp. 1962), and in June 1963 to the University of Alabama, see Exec. Order No.
11,111, 3 C.F.R. 182 (Supp. 1963). For an overview of these events see generally RICH-
ARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 754-59 (1976).
363 For example, during 1967 and 1968 President Johnson deployed troops, in
response to requests from state governors, to respond to urban disturbances in
Detroit, Chicago, and Baltimore; Johnson, acting as Commander in Chief of the D.C.
militia, also used troops in Washington, D.C. See Exec. Order No. 11,364, 32 Fed.
Reg. 10,907 (July 24, 1967); Exec. Order No. 11,403, 3 C.F.R. 107 (1968); Exec. Order
No. 11,404, 3 C.F.R. 108 (1968); Exec. Order No. 11,405, 3 C.F.R. 109 (1968). More
recently, George H.W. Bush, upon request of the governor, sent federal troops to
respond to the riots that broke out in Los Angeles following the verdict in the Rodney
King beating case on April 29, 1992. See Exec. Order No. 12,804, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1992);
Proclamation No. 6427, 3 C.F.R. 44 (1992).
364 The early national government also mobilized the militia to "repel invasions,"
notably during the War of 1812. For a detailed discussion of the use of the militia in
these circumstances, see Mazzone, supra note 251, at 116-21.
365 See generally WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION (2006) (chronicling
the Whiskey Rebellion); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION (1986) (trac-
ing the context, chronology, and consequences of the Whiskey Rebellion).
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government imposed an excise tax on distilled whiskey.3 66 Opposition
to the tax was especially strong among cash-strapped farmers in west-
ern Pennsylvania where, beginning in the fall of 1791, federal tax col-
lectors were attacked. 367 In September 1792, President George
Washington issued a proclamation "exhort[ing] all persons whom it
may concern to refrain and desist from all unlawful combinations and
proceedings whatsoever having for object or tending to obstruct the
operation of the laws," and promising that "all lawful ways and means
will be strictly put in execution for bringing to justice the infractors
thereof and securing obedience thereto."3 68 After a period of relative
quiet, in the spring of 1794, attacks on tax collectors in western Penn-
sylvania renewed. Opposition to the tax also broke out in parts of
Georgia, Kentucky, and North and South Carolina. 369 On July 17,
1794, when federal marshals served court orders requiring distillers to
appear in federal court in Philadelphia, a mob-which included many
members of the state militia-attacked and burned the home of
Inspector John Neville in Bower Hill.370 Regulars arrived from Pitts-
burgh to defend Neville, and one protester was killed in the ensuing
confrontation. 371  On August 4, Supreme Court Associate Justice
James Wilson certified, pursuant to the May 2, 1792 Act, that the "laws
of the United States are opposed, and the execution thereof
obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the
marshal of that district. '3 72 On August 7, Washington issued a second
proclamation directing the protesters to disperse before September 1
or face a military response. 373 On August 14, Secretary of War Henry
Knox ordered militia units from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland,
and Virginia into federal command to enforce the law.374 With some
15,000 militiamen deploying to western Pennsylvania, the insurgents
366 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 365, at 95-105.
367 See id. at 109-14.
368 George Washington, Proclamation of Sept. 15, 1792, reprinted in 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 317, at 124, 124-25.
369 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 365, at 117-19.
370 See id. at 180.
371 See id. at 179-81.
372 Letter from Justice James Wilson to the President of the United States (Aug. 4,
1794), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEous 85, 85 (William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc. 1998) (1834).
373 See George Washington, Proclamation of Aug. 7, 1794, reprinted in 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 317, at 158, 158-60.
374 See COAKLEY, supra note 315, at 39; Letter from Henry Knox, Sec'y of War, to
Thomas Mifflin, Governor of Pa. (Aug. 7, 1794), in 4 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 2d ser.
122, 122-23 Uohn B. Linn & William H. Egle eds., Harrisburg, Pa., B.F. Meyers 1876).
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swiftly retreated, resolving at a gathering on October 24 at Parkinsons'
Ferry to comply with the tax law and to end their fighting. 375 Most of
the insurgents in the Whiskey Rebellion ultimately were pardoned.
376
The exercise had cost the national government more than a million
dollars in militia pay and expenses.37 7 The whiskey tax law itself was
repealed after the election of 1800.378 But the national government
had demonstrated its willingness to use the militia to prevent opposi-
tion to the enforcement of federal law. Writing to Edmund Pendle-
ton, George Washington stated that "no money could have been more
advantageously expended, both as it respects the internal peace and
welfare of this country, and the impression it will make on others" and
that "lIt] he spirit with which the militia turned out in support of the
[C]onstitution and the laws of our country" was "the most conclusive
refutation" of the claim that with independence from Great Britain
"we should be unable to govern ourselves, and would soon be involved
in confusion.
3 79
The federal government also used the militia to execute federal
tax laws during Fries' Rebellion in 1799.380 In the summer of 1798,
Congress passed a revenue law that imposed taxes based on the value
of property-federal tax commissioners were required to determine
the value of homes by taking account of "their situation, their dimen-
sions cr area, their number of stories, the number and dimensions of
their windows, the materials whereof they are built whether wood,
brick or stone, the number, description and dimensions of the out-
houses appurtenant to them, etc."381 When federal "measurers"
arrived in southeastern Pennsylvania, they faced violence from home-
owners who resented the intrusion on their domestic lives. 382 Men
threw the measurers out onto the street; women poured boiling water
on them from the upper levels of their homes. 383 In Bethlehem, on
375 See CoAKLEY¢, supra note 315, at 59-60.
376 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 365, at 219-20.
377 Act of Dec. 31, 1794, ch. 6, § 1, 1 Stat. 404, 404-05 (appropriating
$1,122,569.01 for militia expenses during the Whiskey Rebellion).
378 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 365, at 226.
379 Letter from President George Washington to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 22,
1795), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 32, 34 (Worthington C. Ford ed.,
New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1892).
380 See generally WILLIAM W.H. DAVIS, THE FRIES REBELLION 1798-99, at 38-56
(photo. reprint 1969) (1899) (providing a history and analysis of the conflict); PAUL
D. NEWMAN, FRIES'S REBELLION 60-87 (2004) (discussing the use of the militia to
enforce tax laws).
381 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, § 9, 1 Stat. 580, 586.
382 See ConA'E, supra note 315, at 70.
383 Id.
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March 7, 1799, one hundred men under the leadership of John Fries
attacked the local marshal, Samuel Nichols, and set free seventeen
insurgents that Nichols had arrested.384 A local judge notified Secre-
tary of State Timothy Pickering that the laws were opposed. 38 5 On
March 12, PresidentJohn Adams issued a proclamation directing the
insurgents "to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective
abodes" and threatening a military response.38 6 On March 20, Secre-
tary of War James McHenry directed Pennsylvania Governor Thomas
Mifflin to provide nine troops of militia cavalry and two troops of vol-
unteers from the Philadelphia region, who would join a contingent of
regulars under the command of Brigadier General William McPher-
son of the Pennsylvania militia.387 In early April, under McHenry's
orders, McPherson marched the troops to the region of the distur-
bances-and resistance to the law ended immediately. 388 Fries was
convicted of treason and other ringleaders were convicted of resisting
the law, but on May 21, 1800, Adams pardoned them allY.3 9 Again, the
federal government had demonstrated its ability and willingness to
deploy the militia to ensure the enforcement of federal law.
2. Embargos and Tariffs
In 1808 and 1809, President Thomas Jefferson authorized the
deployment of militiamen and regulars to quell opposition to the fed-
eral embargo laws.390 These laws, designed to force England and
France to respect American rights to neutral trade in the context of
the Napoleonic Wars, prohibited vessels and goods from leaving
American ports.391 Opposition to the laws was especially strong
among the residents of the Lake Champlain region of northern Ver-
mont who depended for their livelihood upon trade with Canada.
3 92
In anticipation of smuggling and other acts of resistance to the
384 Id. at 71.
385 Id.
386 John Adams, Proclamation of Mar. 12, 1799, reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND
PAPEmS, supra note 317, at 286, 287.
387 COAKLEY, supra note 315, at 73.
388 Id. at 73-76.
389 John Adams, Proclamation of May 21, 1800, reprinted in I MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 317, at 303, 304.
390 The Embargo Act was passed on December 22, 1807. See Embargo Act of 1807,
ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (repealed 1809). The Act was amended several times in 1808. See,
e.g., Supplemental Embargo Act of 1808, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453.
391 See generally 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES His-
TORY 324-45 (1926) (discussing the embargo laws).
392 See BENNETr MILTON RICH, THE PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER 31-34 (1941).
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embargo, Jefferson instructed the federal collector in Vermont to arm
and man vessels, authorized the federal marshal to raise his posse, and
instructed the Secretary of War to call on the governor to deploy the
militia if necessary to quell resistance.3 9 3 In May 1808, the governor
deployed a militia detachment to Windmill Point. 39 4 Opposition to
the laws thereafter hardened, with a town meeting in Franklin County
resolving never to submit to the embargo. 395 In August 1808, Jeffer-
son ordered a detachment of the United States Artillery to Franklin
County to quell resistance. 39 6 On January 7, 1809, Congress enlarged
the scope of the embargo laws and authorized the President to deploy
regulars and militiamen
for the purpose of preventing the illegal departure of any ship or
vessel . . . and also for the purpose of preventing and suppressing
any armed or riotous assemblage of persons, resisting the custom-
house officers in the exercise of their duties, or in any manner
opposing the execution of the laws laying an embargo, or otherwise
violating, or assisting and abetting violations of the same.
397
Jefferson immediately wrote to the governor of each of the states
request[ing] you, as commanding officer of the militia of your
State, to appoint some officer of the militia, of known respect for
the laws, in or near to each port of entry within your State, with
orders, when applied to by the collector of the district, to assemble
immediately a sufficient force of his militia, and to employ them
efficaciously to maintain the authority of the laws respecting the
embargo.39
8
Jefferson's use of the militia to enforce the embargo laws was short-
lived. The embargo proved an economic disaster and, responding to
intense popular pressure, Congress repealed the general embargo in
March 1809 and implemented the more limited Non-Intercourse
Act. 399 Nonetheless, the incident demonstrated that the executive
branch considered the use of the militia to be the proper way to
enforce a federal law that faced resistance on the ground.
393 See FEDERAL AID, supra note 332, at 41.
394 Id.
395 Id. at 42.
396 Id.
397 Act of Jan. 9, 1809, ch. 5, § 11, 2 Stat. 506, 510.
398 Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to the Governors of the United States
(Jan. 17, 1809), in FEDERAL AID, supra note 332, at 43, 43.
399 Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528 (1809) (repealed 1815) (allowing for
the resumption of commercial intercourse except with Britain and France). See gener-
ally BURTON SPIVAK, JEFFERSON'S ENGLISH CIsIs 186-97 (1979) (recounting the efforts
in Congress leading to the repeal).
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The federal government could also deploy regulars to quell oppo-
sition to federal law. Hence, when in November 1832 a convention in
South Carolina voted to "nullify" the Federal Tariff Act of 1832400 and
resist the enforcement of the law,40 1 President Andrew Jackson read-
ied federal troops in Charleston to enforce federal authority.40 2 Jack-
son also made plans to use South Carolina Unionists, along with
volunteers from other states, as part of the posse comitatus.40 3 In Feb-
ruary 1833, Congress passed a "force act," authorizing the use of any
necessary military force to quell opposition to the laws. 40 4 A compro-
mise, in which Congress reduced the federal tariffs and South Caro-
lina rescinded its nullification resolution, averted a crisis. 40 5
3. Civil War and Reconstruction
When the Confederacy formed in February 1861, the federal gov-
ernment framed its response within the existing legal structures for
the use of military power to enforce federal law. Lincoln's proclama-
tion of April 15, 1861, calling on 75,000 militiamen to suppress the
rebellion in the Confederate states,40 6 tracked the constitutional and
statutory provisions that gave the President authority to deploy the
militia to overcome resistance to federal laws. 40 7 On July 13, 1861, in
400 Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583 (repealed 1833).
401 See Act of Dec. 20, 1832, ch. 3, 1832 S.C. Acts 15 (nullification ordinance).
402 See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR 265-81 (1966).
403 See COAKLEY, supra note 315, at 94-102. In his proclamation of December 10,
1832, Jackson denounced South Carolina's assertion of a power to nullify federal law
and he vowed to enforce the law. See AndrewJackson, Proclamation of Dec. 10, 1832,
reprinted in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 317, at 640, 643.
404 Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 5, 4 Stat. 632, 634.
405 FREEHLING, supra note 402, at 292-96.
406 Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Apr. 15, 1861, reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 317, at 13, 13.
407 See id. On April 19, Lincoln issued a proclamation that put in place a blockade
on the ports of the secessionist states and the next day ordered an addition of
nineteen vessels to the navy. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Apr. 19, 1861,
reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 317, at 14, 14-15. On May 3, Lincoln
ordered an increase in the size of the army by 22,714 men, an increase in the navy by
18,000 men and directed that provision be made for 42,032 volunteers for a term of
three years. See Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of May 3, 1861, reprinted in 6
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 317, at 15, 16. On August 6, 1861, Congress sanc-
tioned these actions. See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326, 326 (specifying
that "all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President... after... [March 4,
1861], respecting the army and navy.., and calling out or relating to the militia or
volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and ... made valid ... as if they had
been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the
Congress").
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the guise of a customs revenue law, Congress amended the Act of Feb-
ruary 28, 1795,408 to provide that when the President directed insur-
gents to disperse and the insurgents (i) failed to comply and (ii)
claimed to act under the authority of a state, and (iii) the state's offi-
cials did not repudiate the claim and put down the rebellion, the Pres-
ident could declare the inhabitants of a state or part of the state in
"insurrection against the United States. ' 40 9 As a result, the President
could prohibit commerce with the rebel state and seize its goods and
vessels.410 Pursuant to this authority, on August 16, 1861, Lincoln
declared the Confederate states to be in insurrection.
411
During Reconstruction, federal troops quelled riots in the former
Confederate states, including large-scale racial disturbances at Nor-
folk, Virginia in April 1866 and at Memphis, Tennessee, in May of the
same year. 412 New Orleans had a long and volatile experience with
federal troops responding to violence in connection with disputes
over the legitimacy of governmental operations. In July 1866, federal
troops implemented martial law in the city when, during a convention
that claimed authority to revise the state constitution but was opposed
by the mayor as an illegal gathering, violence broke out between the
supporters of the convention and the local police.41 3 So too, in Sep-
tember 1874, President Grant dispatched troops to restore order in
New Orleans upon a request for assistance under Article IV of the
Constitution by Governor William Pitt Kellogg, whose authority was
challenged by rivals who claimed they had won the 1872 state elec-
tions. 414 Elsewhere, in May 1871, in response to growing racial vio-
lence, and pursuant to the Ku Klux Clan Act of 1871,415 Grant
deployed troops to several counties in South Carolina and suspended
408 Ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424.
409 Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 5, 12 Stat. 255, 257 (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§ 205 (2000)).
410 See id. §§ 5-6, 12 Stat. at 257 (providing for the suspension of commercial
intercourse with state in insurrection); supra note 357 and accompanying text.
411 Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Aug. 16, 1861, reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 317, at 37, 37-38.
412 See COAKLEY, supra note 315, at 273-80.
413 See id. at 280-87. PresidentJohnson's handling of the incident produced wide-
spread criticism and contributed to the success of the Radicals in the 1866 congres-
sional elections. Id. at 287.
414 See FEDERAL AID, supra note 332, at 124-39; JoE GRAY TAYLOR, LOUISIANA
RECONSTRUCTED 1863-1877, at 291-96 (1974); TED TUNNELL, CRUCIBLE OF RECON-
STRUcI7ION, 1862-1877, at 202-04 (1984).
415 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (requiring the President to take steps to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment).
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habeas corpus in those counties.4 16 Hundreds of members of the Ku
Klux Klan were arrested and prosecuted in federal court.4 17 In addi-
tion, after repeated pleas by the governor of Mississippi, Grant sent
troops to Vicksburg in the fall of 1874 to restore peace when munici-
pal elections produced racial violence that prevented elected officials
from taking office. 4 18 In December 1876, Grant also stationed troops
at the statehouse in Columbia, South Carolina, to protect the mem-




Federal troops have been deployed with some frequency during
labor disputes-often with the justification that the deployment was to
maintain law and order rather than to take sides in the dispute. For
example, in July 1877, during a period of widespread labor uprisings,
governors of nine states called on President Rutherford B. Hayes for
federal assistance in maintaining order. Though Hayes might have
intervened in order to protect the delivery of the mails and interstate
commerce (both were interrupted in some areas) he sent troops for
the specific reason of enforcing the mandates of the federal courts
416 See FEDERAL AID, supra note 332, at 103.
417 See id.
418 See NIcHotAs LEMANN, REDEMPTION 63-99 (2006) (recounting the events).
419 See FEDERAL AID, supra note 332, at 160-61. On December 9, 1876, the House
requested that Grant provide copies of orders and communications relating to the
use of troops in Virginia, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida. Report from Presi-
dent Ulysses Grant to the House of Representatives (Jan. 22, 1877), in 7 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 317, at 418. Grant penned a report in which he emphasized
that "troops of the United States have been but sparingly used, and in no case so as to
interfere with the free exercise of the right of suffrage." Id. at 419. Grant wrote that
in the states in question there was "no doubt whatever in my mind that intimidation
has been used, and actual violence, to an extent requiring the aid of the United States
Government." Id. In justifying his deployment of troops, Grant pointed to various
constitutional and statutory grounds. In Florida and in Louisiana, he wrote,
"soldiers ... were stationed at such points in each State as were most threatened with
violence, where they might be available as a posse for the officer whose duty it was to
preserve the peace and prevent intimidation of voters," and that this "disposition of
the troops seemed to me reasonable and justified by law and precedent, while its
omission would have been inconsistent with the constitutional duty of the President
of the United States 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed."' Id. at 419-20.
Grant also cited Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution and the statutory provisions
authorizing the use of troops to prevent insurrections and execute federal laws. Id. at
420. Grant further invoked, as historical precedent, uses of troops to quell the Whis-
key Rebellion and to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. See id. at 421.
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and to protect federal property.420 During the Pullman Strike in the
summer of 1894, Grover Cleveland sent federal troops to Chicago to
prevent the obstruction of the mails, protect interstate commerce,
and ensure the operations of the federal courts. 421 In December
1907, President Theodore Roosevelt sent federal troops to Goldfield,
Nevada, at the request of the governor for assistance in quelling a
miners' strike. 422 Roosevelt directed that the troops act only to main-
tain order at the scene of the strike. 423 President Woodrow Wilson,
also at the request of the governor, sent federal troops to Ludlow,
Colorado, in April 1914 to maintain order following violent strikes at
coalmines. 424 In September 1919, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker
420 See S. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES & DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS,
93D CONG., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES 32-33
(Comm. Print 1974); FEDERAL AID, supra note 332, at 162-75; RICH, supra note 392, at
72-86.
421 See FEDERAL AID, supra note 332, at 196-99; RICH, supra note 392, at 91-99.
The Pullman strikes resulted in an important affirmation of federal power in the pros-
ecution of Eugene Debs, President of the American Railway Union and a strike
leader. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 578-79, 582 (1895), abrogated on other grounds by
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Debs (along with other union leaders) had
been held in contempt for violating an injunction issued by the U.S. circuit court and
sentenced to a prison term of six months. See RICH, supra note 392, at 105-06. He
sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, arguing that he had been
denied the right to ajury trial. Id. at 106. Rejecting the argument, Justice Brewer, for
a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote sweepingly of the federal government's authority
to intervene to enforce federal laws:
"[T]he government of the United States may, by means of physical force,
exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil
the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the
power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the
peace to that extent."
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part
of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security
of all rights intrusted by the Constitution to its care. The strong arm of the
national government may be put forth to brush away all obstructions to the
freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails. If the
emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and all its militia, are at the service
of the Nation to compel obedience to its laws.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 578-79, 582 (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395
(1879)).
422 RICH, supra note 392, at 125-29.
423 Id. at 129. The troops were withdrawn when Secretary of State Elihu Root
advised the President that since there was no evidence that the state legislature could
not be convened, deployment of troops at the request of the governor for this pur-
pose was improper. See id. at 129-35.
424 See id. at 140-42.
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sent federal troops to maintain order in Omaha, Nebraska, following
labor riots and racial violence.425 The following month, troops were
dispatched to Gary, Indiana, at the governor's request to end violence
by striking steel workers. 426 President Warren Harding sent troops to
the southern border of West Virginia in September 1921, at the state's
request, to quell violence related to miner strikes.427
F. Summary
The Framers of the Constitution recognized that federalism
presents obstacles to responding to emergencies, and included consti-
tutional provisions to resolve the problem. The federal government is
permitted to call into temporary service state government person-
nel-the militia-in order to respond to emergencies when they
occur; from its earliest days, Congress has provided the statutory
mechanisms to allow the President to deploy quickly members of state
militia units to the site of emergencies; the President has used his
authority on numerous occasions throughout our history. Though
the Constitution authorizes the use of regular troops instead of the
militia (and the federal government has elected to use regular troops
in some circumstances), the availability of the militia is designed to
give the federal government a way to respond to emergencies while
using, rather than bypassing, state resources.
IV. EMERGENCY COMMANDEERING
For a good part of this nation's history, the national government
made use of the constitutional provisions that authorize it to comman-
deer state militia units to respond to emergencies. In light of the fail-
ures of Katrina, it is time to consider how those provisions can be put
to use in modern times. Though the militia of 1789 no longer exists,
there is, I argue in this Part, a useful way to understand the federal
government's emergency commandeering powers today. This Part
proposes that the Constitution authorizes the national government to
commandeer state and local emergency response personnel-police,
firefighters, emergency medical technicians, urban search and rescue
teams, and public health specialists-and deploy them to the sites of
modern emergences. Just as in earlier times the national government
deployed militiamen to respond to emergencies, today the national
425 See id. at 154-55.
426 See id. at 156-57.
427 See id. at 164-67.
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government should be entitled to call into federal service the emer-
gency response personnel of modern state and local governments. 428
A. Statutory Provisions
Congress should pass a statute authorizing the federal govern-
ment to commandeer law enforcement and other state and local per-
sonnel in times of emergency. The emergency commandeering
statute, passed pursuant to Congress' power under Article I, Section 8
to "provide for calling forth the Militia,"429 would authorize the Presi-
dent to call into periods of mandatory federal service the relevant
state and local personnel for the purposes of "execut[ing] the Laws of
the Union, suppressling] Insurrections and repel[ling] Invasions. '430
The statute should set out the circumstances in which state personnel
can be used for these purposes, including which personnel can be
used and from which states, the procedures for placing them under
federal control, and the period of time in which they can be required
to serve.43 1 Pursuant to that statutory authorization, and in accor-
428 I recognize that in some communities, fire fighters, medical response person-
nel, and other responders might be volunteers rather than employees of the local or
state government. In particular, of the 1,088,950 firefighters in the United States in
2002, 822,850 were volunteers and 266,100 were career firefighters. See FED. EMER-
GENCY MGMT. AGENCY & NAT'L FIRE PROT. ASS'N, A NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. FIRE
SERVICE 15 (2002) [hereinafter NEEDS ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.
usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-240.pdf. There also exist vast numbers
of "private police." See generally David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1165, 1173-76 (1999) (discussing the increasing popularity of private patrols and
other security personnel). I recognize also that local response efforts might involve a
combination of public and private resources-for example, private emergency medi-
cal services might bear principal responsibility for providing immediate victim care
and hospitals might be private institutions. My analysis in this Article is limited to the
commandeering of state and local personnel. However, given the ability of the fed-
eral government to define broadly the militia, the federal government could also, if
needed, call into service private individuals-doctors, security guards and the like.
But see Michael H. LeRoy, Compulsory Labor in a National Emergency: Public Service or
Involuntaty Servitude? The Case of Crippled Ports, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forth-
coming 2007) (manuscript at 40-46), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract992771
(discussing Thirteenth Amendment limitations on the government's power to compel
work by civilian workers during emergencies).
429 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
430 Id.
431 During the War of 1812, disputes arose as to whether states could contest a
federal determination that circumstances satisfied the conditions for which the Con-
stitution permits use of the militia. The national government took the position that
states had no power to second-guess a federal determination; states eventually
accepted this understanding. See Mazzone, supra note 251, at 116-25 (discussing the
disputes and their resolution). The Supreme Court also took the view that federal
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dance with its terms, when the emergency condition arises, the Presi-
dent will be entitled to issue the call to duty and take command of the
relevant state personnel. The statute should also provide that when
the emergency ends, the state personnel will return to the control of
state government.
The authorizing statute should give the President discretion to
determine how best to deploy available resources to respond to an
emergency. In some kinds of emergencies, especially those that are
localized, the President will call into federal service state personnel
from the state in which the emergency arises. In other emergencies,
the President will call on personnel from other states and send them
to the scene of the incident. In some emergencies, the President will
rely entirely on state and local personnel. In other emergencies, state
personnel will serve along with military personnel, federalized
National Guard troops, and other federal employees. In still other
emergencies, the President might elect to forego using state person-
nel entirely and respond with federal personnel: the availability of
state and local emergency response personnel is not a requirement
that the President use them.
The old militia did not serve under federal command for free
and neither would modern state and local emergency response per-
sonnel. The authorizing statute should therefore specify that the fed-
eral government is responsible for paying for the use of state
personnel. Covered costs would include, of course, the salary of work-
ers. In addition, the federal government should cover associated
costs, such as for equipment, uniforms, transportation, medical care,
and housing during periods of service away from home. Congress
could decide that the federal government will pay state and federal
personnel directly during periods of federal service. Alternatively, the
federal government could reimburse state and local governments for
the expenses incurred in using their employees.
In order for law enforcement and other state personnel to per-
form effectively when called into federal service, Congress should also
require as a statutory matter that they receive advance training (again,
at federal expense) in relevant emergency procedures and practices.
Congress' power to pass this requirement would lie in the provision of
Article I, Section 8 empowering Congress to "provide for organizing,
power was exclusive, accepting that under the 1795 Militia Act, "the authority to
decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and . ..
his decision is conclusive upon all other persons." Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
19, 30 (1827) (upholding a fine against a militiamen who refused to report to duty).
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arming, and disciplining, the Militia."432 The White House report on
Katrina recommends national training programs for emergency
response personnel43 3 and other programs to standardize response
capabilities.4 3 4 Indeed, FEMA and other federal governmental agen-
cies currently offer, on a voluntary basis, various training programs for
law enforcement and other state and local employees;435 private enti-
ties also conduct relevant training sessions.436 These programs should
be expanded upon to ensure that state and local personnel have the
requisite skills when called into federal service. For instance, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control might provide training in detecting and han-
dling biological and chemical agents, decontamination procedures,
and the implementation of quarantine measures. The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives can teach identification
and destruction of explosive materials and devices. The Food and
Drug Administration and the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices can provide instruction on deploying medical devices and treat-
ments in the event of an emergency. The FBI's Hazardous Materials
Response Unit can train local responders in responding to incidents
involving hazardous materials. 437 In practice, the federal government
might elect to give every responder common training. The govern-
ment might instead give certain law enforcement officers, or other
personnel, specialized training in specific tasks. For instance, one
police department in a city might have special training in crowd con-
trol while another becomes highly skilled in search and rescue. Some
public health officials might be trained in communicating informa-
tion about outbreaks to federal agencies while others know how to
rapidly deploy vaccines and other supplies.
Finally, the authorizing statute should specify that the states have
no power to resist the use of their personnel by the federal govern-
ment for emergency purposes. States could not, for example, prohibit
their employees from reporting to federal duty or otherwise obstruct
432 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
433 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 43, at 118-20.
434 See id. at 122.
435 For example, FEMA operates an "Emergency Management Institute" that pro-
vides resident and nonresident instruction on emergency management: mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. See Emergency Management Institute
Homepage, http://www.training.fema.gov/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
436 See Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement, http://
www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/tta/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2007) (col-
lecting programs); Mem'l Inst. for the Prevention of Terrorism, Courses and Training
Events, http://www.mipt.org/trainingcourses.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
437 See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory Services, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/
lab/html/hmrul.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
[VOL. 83:1
THE COMMANDEERER IN CHIEF
the federal government's emergency commandeering powers. Nor
could states fire or otherwise punish their employees for periods of
federal service.
B. By the Numbers
Today, with the ongoing deployment of troops to Iraq, federal
military personnel (including members of the National Guard in fed-
eral service) are "stretched thin."4 38  State and local emergency
response personnel therefore represent an important resource.
Adopting the emergency commandeering proposal offered here will
make available more than six million state and local police officers for
the federal government to deploy to respond to emergencies, 459 along
with more than a quarter million career firefighters, 440 and nearly
900,000 emergency medical service personnel. 441 Just as the old mili-
tia represented an alternative to maintaining federal troops, today,
state and local emergency responders represent an alternative to
using professional soldiers in times of emergency.
438 JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 30 (2006), available
at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq-study-group-report/report/1206/iraq-study_
group-report.pdf; see also id. at 76 ("U.S. military forces . . . have been stretched
nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments in Iraq ... ."); Scott Shane
& Thom Shanker, Mhen Storm Hit, National Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2005, at Al (reporting that Louisiana National Guard commanders considered
the Guard's response to Katrina "crippled... by a severe shortage of troops that they
blame in part on the deployment to Iraq of 3,200 Louisiana guardsmen"); Thorn
Shanker & Michael R. Gordon, Strained, Army Looks to Guard for More Relief N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2006, at Al ("So many [active army units] are deployed or only recently
returned from combat duty that only two or three combat brigades-perhaps 7,000 to
10,000 troops-are fully ready to respond in cases of unexpected crises, according to
a senior Army general.").
439 For data on the number of state and local law enforcement officers, see
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 17, at 42 tbl.1.27. For fiscal year 2007, Con-
gress authorized more than 1.3 million active duty members of the regular military.
See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, § 401, 120 Stat. 2083, 2168-69 (2006) (authorizing active duty strengths of
512,400 for the Army, 340,700 for the Navy, 180,000 for the Marine Corps, and
334,200 for the Air Force).
440 In 2002, the most recent year for which data is available, there were 266,100
career firefighters in the United States. NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 428, at 15.
441 See Brian J. Maguire, Current Emergency Medical Services Workforce Issues in the
United States, J. EMERGENCY MGMT., Summer 2004, at 17, 20-21; Nat'l Ass'n of Emer-
gency Med. Technicians, EMS Statistics, http://www.naemt.org/aboutEMSAnd-
Careers/ems statistics.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
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C. Locating the Militia
An objection to the proposal offered here is that modern law
enforcement and other emergency personnel are not the "militia"
within the meaning of the 1789 Constitution-therefore the federal
government lacks the authority to call forth these modern state and
local personnel. However, there are at least three good reasons why
Congress can properly invoke its militia powers to enact a modern
emergency commandeering statute.
First, the Constitution does not itself define the militia; nothing
in the Constitution specifies who is a member. From the earliest days
of the Republic, Congress has made and relied upon its own defini-
tion of the militia within the meaning of Article 1.442 Congress did not
see a need to defer to state law on who comprised the militia.443 Fol-
lowing this early tradition, Congress should be free today to define the
militia, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, to include all law
enforcement, firefighters, public health personnel, and other emer-
gency workers. Second, functionally, the closest modern analogue to
the old militia-which, in addition to combat, performed various
kinds of public order functions-is probably the police (and not the
National Guard) .444 Third, even if Congress were required to follow a
historical understanding of the militia as all or some significant part of
the entire body of free men, 445 with perhaps a modification, in light of
the Nineteenth Amendment, to also include women, 446 Congress can
still enact the proposed emergency commandeering statute. However
broadly one defines the militia, Congress can provide for calling forth
442 See supra notes 289-92, 431 and accompanying text.
443 In 1859, upon the governor's request, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court issued an advisory opinion that the state was bound by Congress' definition of
the "militia" under the Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (repealed
1903). See In re Opinion of the Justices, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 614, 619 (1859) ("The
general government having authority to determine who shall and who may not com-
pose the militia, and having so determined, the state government has no legal author-
ity to prescribe a different enrolment.").
444 See Mazzone, supra note 251, at 142 n.621 (discussing why law enforcement is
the closest modern equivalent to the militia).
445 See generally CREss, supra note 35, at 3-33 (discussing the early colonial use of
militias as "require [ing] all free white males to provide their own weapons, keep them
in good repair, and attend frequent militia drills"); Ansell, supra note 35, at 472-78
(illuminating the meaning and existence of the nation's militia via legal and historical
analysis).
446 See generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 I-Luv. L. REV. 947, 960-77 (2002) (arguing for a "syn-
thetic" reading of the Nineteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that would
"reground[ ] sex discrimination doctrine in constitutional history").
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that part that comprises police officers, firefighters, and the like. In
other words, Congress can retain its current (broad) statutory defini-
tion of the militia,447 and yet pick and choose among the members of
the militia best suited to respond to terrorism, natural disasters, or
other emergencies-the federal government is not required to call
forth every member of the militia or nobody at all. Instead, the fed-
eral government can today deploy that portion of the militia that com-
prises state and local emergency personnel. In this sense, a very broad
definition of the militia for constitutional purposes works to Congress'
advantage. A similar conclusion would follow if Congress was
required to follow the states' own (very broad) definitions of their
militias.44
8
More generally, emergency commandeering is consistent with,
indeed good for, federalism. Rather than the federal government
bypassing states and localities, emergency commandeering involves
the use of preexisting state and local resources. Instead of deploy-
ment of professional soldiers (historically, the most dreaded force of
all) or of federal personnel from Washington, D.C., emergency com-
mandeering involves the employment of police officers, firefighters,
and other civilians.
D. Triggers
In accordance with the constitutional provisions authorizing the
use of the militia, there are three circumstances in which the federal
government is entitled to commandeer law enforcement and other
employees of state and local governments: to repel invasions, suppress
insurrections, and to execute federal laws.4 49 The role that state emer-
gency response personnel can usefully play in these three circum-
stances will depend upon the particular nature of the emergency at
hand.
If invasions take the classic form of a foreign power launching an
attack on the homeland, the federal government is, of course, likely to
depend principally on the military-whose job it is to defend the
nation. At the same time, even in the context of repelling the inva-
sion, the federal government might find it beneficial to deploy state
and local personnel: police departments might be directed to assist in
447 10 U.S.C. § 311 (a) (2000) ("The militia of the United States consists of all able-
bodied males at least 17 years of age and ... under 45 years of age who are, or who
have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of
female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.").
448 See supra Part I.B.2.
449 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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arresting foreign spies, to provide security at high-risk targets, or to
enforce a curfew; public health officials might provide medical assis-
tance; firefighters might be deployed to monitor cities for evidence of
biological or chemical attacks.
Insurrections will present a variety of circumstances in which the
federal government can make good use of state and local emergency
response personnel. Police can respond quickly to riots and other dis-
turbances, disperse crowds, and enforce barriers, street blockades,
and curfews. Police can also protect vulnerable members of the popu-
lation and secure government offices and other buildings under
attack. Fire departments can respond to arson and other physical
dangers. Bomb squads can respond to uses of, or threatened uses of,
explosive devices. Health workers can provide medical assistance to
injured responders and other victims of violence.
Terrorism might be deemed an invasion, because it involves an
attack from outsiders, or deemed an insurrection, because it involves a
domestic uprising. 450 In either case, the federal government can use-
fully deploy police officers to operate checkpoints at bridges and tun-
nels, patrol harbors, inspect vehicles entering cities, provide security
on mass transit, and guard buildings. Firefighters or public health
personnel can be deployed to test for noxious agents in subways, bus
450 This characterization might have one important implication. Article I autho-
rizes Congress to provide for calling forth the militia to suppress insurrections and to
repel invasions. Id. While Article IV requires the federal government to "protect" the
states against invasion, it only requires the federal government to protect the states
against "domestic violence" when the state makes a request. Id. art. IV, § 4. Though
the Constitution does not specifically prohibit the federal government from
deploying the militia in response to an insurrection, one might read Article IV, if
insurrection is equivalent to "domestic violence," to imply as much. On this view, if a
terrorist attack is an insurrection/incident of domestic violence, the federal govern-
ment must wait for a state request before sending forces to help. Perhaps a better
understanding is that an insurrection is an effort to overthrow the government, and is
therefore more serious than "domestic violence," which is in turn merely opposition
to the enforcement of the laws. Therefore, the federal government's power to inter-
vene with militia only arises when domestic violence escalates to insurrection-the
state government is in the best position to make this call. Evidence from the Found-
ing era is not entirely clear. In considering the proposal that became Section 4 of
Article IV, delegates spoke variously about "domestic . . . violence," "rebellions," and
"dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 47-48, (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (reporting the
statements of James Wilson, James Madison, Luther Martin, and John Rutledge).
Without debate, the convention refused a last minute proposal to substitute "insurrec-
tions" for "domestic violence" in Article IV, Section 4. See id. at 467. It is not clear
whether that change (which would make Article IV mirror the Article I language) was
rejected because insurrection was considered a synonym for domestic violence or
because a difference was intended.
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stations, and at public events. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
teams can be sent to seize suspected insurgents; undercover officers
can infiltrate terrorist organizations.
The third constitutional basis for commandeering state person-
nel is to execute federal laws. This basis will allow the federal govern-
ment to commandeer state emergency response personnel in a wide
variety of circumstances where the enforcement of federal law is at
risk. The most obvious is where, as in the Whiskey Rebellion and
Fries' Rebellion, organized opponents of a law interfere with its
enforcement. 45' Organized opposition might take the form of vio-
lence against federal officials, the occupation of federal buildings, or
the harboring of individuals subject to regulation. The federal gov-
ernment is entitled to deploy state and local personnel to end inter-
ference of this nature with federal law enforcement.
Various other kinds of emergencies can produce obstructions to
an array of federal laws, and thereby also trigger the government's
power to commandeer state and local personnel. Looting, violence,
and other kinds of unlawful activity are a frequent accompaniment to
all variety of emergencies, including blackouts, 452 earthquakes,453 hur-
ricanes, 454 and terrorism. 455 Emergencies might result in obstructions
of the mail; federal law creates the postal system, provides for the
delivery of the mail, 456 and prohibits "knowingly and willfully
obstruct[ing] or retard[ing] the passage of the mail, or any carrier or
451 See supra Part III.E.1.
452 Most famously, the widespread looting that occurred in New York City in July
1977. SeeJONATHAN MAHLER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE BRONX Is BURNING 187-95
(2007) (recounting the events). By contrast, a blackout in the City in August 2003
produced relatively little looting. See Michael Wilson, Central Parts of Brooklyn Saw the
Worst of Looting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at B4.
453 See SIMON WINCHESTER, A CRACK IN THE EDGE OF THE WORLD 307-08 (2005)
(describing looting during the San Francisco earthquake of 1906); Don Davis, Quake
Cripples Bay Area: Toll 250 and Rising; Roads, Bridges Fall, SAN DIEGO UNION, Oct. 18,
1989, at Al (describing looting in San Francisco after the earthquake in October
1989).
454 See, e.g., Paul Flemming, New Charge Sought for Gougers; Attorney General Pushes
Harsher Punishments, NEWS-PRESS (Sw. Fla.), Oct. 2, 2004, at 1B (reporting more than
10,000 allegations of price-gouging during the 2004 Florida hurricane season).
455 See Richard Lezin Jones, Security Cameras Planned for Mall in Trade Center Ruins,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B10 (describing looting at the World Trade Center site
following the attacks of September 11, 2001); William Mauldin, 74 Arrested for
Post-9/11 Larceny, N.Y. SUN, June 19, 2003, at 11 (reporting the theft of $15 million
from ATM machines following the interruption of electronic banking service).
456 See 39 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2007).
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conveyance carrying the mail. '457 So too, emergencies might obstruct
commerce; federal law also prohibits interference with interstate com-
merce. 45 8 Katrina had a substantial impact on interstate commerce,
including by undermining energy production. 459 Emergencies can
easily interfere with the flow of traffic on federal-aid highways460 and
obstruct navigable waters. 461 Emergencies can interfere with enforce-
ment of federal criminal statutes, for instance, laws regulating fire-
arms; 46 2 prohibiting the use of minors in crimes of violence;
46 3
prohibiting possession of biological toxins 464 and chemical weap-
ons; 4 6 5 prohibiting access to secured federal property, seaports and
airports;466 prohibiting interstate domestic violence; 4 67 prohibiting
457 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); see also In reDebs, 158 U.S. 564, 586 (1895) (recogniz-
ing federal power to remove from the highways things that obstruct the mails or inter-
state commerce), abrogated on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
458 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000) (prohibiting "obstruct[ing], delay[ing], or
affect[ing] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by
robbery or extortion . . . or commit[ting] or threaten[ing] physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section").
459 See Micheline Maynard, Carriers Are Stricken by Cancellations and Lack of Fuel, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at C4 ("The airline industry felt the brunt of Hurricane Katrina
yesterday, with some airports running low on jet fuel and carriers canceling hundreds
of flights. Meanwhile, Wall Street feared that the financial problems of the sickest
airlines could grow worse."); Eduardo Porter, Hurricane's Disruption of Key Energy Sys-
tents Hits Variety of Industries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at C1 ("[E]conomists warned
that [Katrina] was likely to leave a deeper mark on the national economy than previ-
ous hurricanes because of its profound disruption to the Gulf of Mexico's complex
energy supply network.").
460 See 23 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (defining the "Federal-aid systems" as the "Inter-
state System and the National Highway System").
461 See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000) (prohibiting "any obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United
States").
462 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (prohibiting interstate
sales of firearms except between licensed dealers); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) (prohib-
iting any convicted felon from possessing any firearm shipped or transported in inter-
state or foreign commerce); id. § 922(o) (prohibiting the possession of fully
automatic firearms manufactured before 1986); 26 U.S.C.. §§ 5812, 5841(a), (e)
(2000) (imposing registration requirements and transfer restrictions on fully auto-
matic weapons and certain other firearms).
463 18 U.S.C. § 25 (Supp. IV 2004).
464 Id. § 175(b).
465 Id. § 229 (2000).
466 18 U.S.C.A. § 1036 (West Supp. 2007).
467 Id. § 2261 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
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transportation of minors for use in sexual activity;4 6 8 and prohibiting
damage to nuclear facilities.
4 69
Emergencies might also put at risk the enforcement of a range of
federal civil statutes, including federal tax laws and immigration laws.
So too, emergencies might threaten federal property4 70 (for example,
the post office), put federal employees at risk, or undermine federal
electoral processes. Emergencies can interfere with federal judicial
processes, such as the operations of federal courts and the enforce-
ment of court judgments and decrees, the safety of witnesses, 47' and
the security of federal prisoners. An emergency might risk destruc-
tion of records related to a federal investigation. 472 Katrina is again
instructive: flooding in police evidence rooms in New Orleans jeop-
ardized some three thousand prosecutions.4 73 Some emergencies will
themselves trigger a federal investigation: after a terrorist attack, for
example, the federal government will likely seek to bring criminal
charges against the perpetrators and so will have an interest in secur-
ing the crime scene and preserving evidence.
Significantly, federal power to intervene when emergencies occur
should not be limited to narrowly defined security functions like
patrolling streets, guarding federal property, or arresting individuals
who interfere with the execution of federal laws. Rather, federal
power should extend to all activities that restore order and facilitate
the implementation of federal law. 4 74 For example, preventing loot-
ing in the aftermath of a hurricane might require the use of police
officers to guard stores-but also police cadets to distribute food sup-
plies and equipment to stranded residents so that looting becomes
unnecessary. If a terrorist attack produces vigilantism, the federal gov-
ernment can deploy police to implement a curfew-it can also dis-
patch firefighters and search and rescue personnel to help victims
escape dangerous parts of town. During the outbreak of a disease, the
468 Id. § 2423 (West Supp. 2007).
469 42 U.S.C.A. § 2284 (West Supp. 2007).
470 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1851-1864 (2000) (defining crimes in connection with public
lands).
471 Id. § 1512 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (prohibiting tampering with witnesses, vic-
tims, and informants).
472 Id. § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004) (criminalizing the destruction or alteration of fed-
eral records).
473 Kevin Johnson, Engulfed Evidence Puts New Orleans Court Cases in Doubt, USA
TODAY, Sept. 22, 2005, at 6A.
474 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
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federal government can place guards at public hospitals to prevent
panicked citizens from seizing vaccines-it can also send medical per-
sonnel to distribute supplies to victims so as to reduce the likelihood
that a hospital will come under attack.
In addition, emergencies might require federal intervention to
protect civil rights. 47 5 An emergency could easily produce racial vio-
lence, interference with property, attacks on religious minorities, or
suppression of opposition viewpoints. Katrina led to violations of pris-
oners' rights: the U.S. Department of Justice is investigating violence
committed against inmates during the chaos of the hurricane. 476
Thousands of people who were arrested before the storm, many on
minor charges, were held in detention for unduly long periods477 and
without access to lawyers. 478 The federal government is also entitled
to deploy state and local personnel to secure rights protected under
federal law.
E. Katrina Replayed
Consider, then, how emergency commandeering would have
played out during Katrina. Once it became evident that the hurricane
would jeopardize federal interests in the region, the President, in
accordance with the relevant statutory scheme, would have called into
federal service sufficient state and local emergency personnel to
mount an effective response. The President would likely have begun
by federalizing police officers, firefighters, search and rescue workers,
hazardous waste crews, and other emergency personnel in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama. There would have been no need for the
governors of those states (or for local officials) to consent to federali-
zation: the order would have issued directly to the chiefs of police, fire
and other departments, and the personnel would have reported to
475 In the modern codification of the Ku Klux Klan Act, federal law prohibits "con-
spir[ing] or go[ing] in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
102-03 (1971) (setting out elements of a claim under this provision).
476 Bruce Alpert, Investigation Opens into Possible Inmate Abuse, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Oct. 4, 2005, at A3; Michael Perlstein, Prison Became Island of Fear, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 23, 2005, at Al.
477 Henry Weinstein, 2500 Arrested Before Katrina Are Still in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2005, at A38.
478 See Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor Inmates Without Justice Since Hurricane,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at Al (reporting on orders issued by New Orleans Judge
Arthur L. Hunter Jr. to release detained defendants held for long periods without
being granted counsel because of a shortage of public defenders).
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duty. In addition, given the magnitude of the hurricane, the Presi-
dent would likely have also deployed to New Orleans and other towns
law enforcement and other personnel from neighboring states.
Again, the order would have issued directly to the police department
in Little Rock, the leader of the search and rescue team in Austin, the
fire chief in Atlanta, and so on. If needed, personnel from farther
away would also be called into federal service. These commandeered
state and local personnel would be dispatched to the affected region
where, drawing upon their prior training in federal programs, they
would carry out the response effort under federal authority. They
would be paid and outfitted by the federal government. Once their
tour of federal duty ended, they would return home and resume their
employment with state or local government.
F Capacities
Law enforcement and other employees of state and local govern-
ments are well prepared to respond to a variety of emergencies under
federal command. More than four hundred police departments in
the United States have specialized bomb dispersal units. 4 79 Hazardous
materials units ("HazMat units") in local police departments are
trained to be the first responders in the event of chemical or biologi-
cal incidents. 48 0 In Idaho, Regional Response Teams stand ready to
respond to incidents anywhere in the state involving hazardous mater-
ials.48 1 Local law enforcement has training in and experience with
responding to riots and controlling crowds48 2 and can employ SWAT
teams to respond to high-risk incidents. 48 3 In Massachusetts, person-
nel of the state Department of Public Health provide and coordinate
emergency medical services following natural disasters and terrorist
attacks. 484 In Los Angeles, the Terrorism Early Warning Group, a
479 William F. McCarthy, Bombs and Bomb Squads, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT 26, 26 (Larry E. Sullivan & Marie Simonetti Rosen eds., 2005) [herein-
after ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT].
480 Ellen Sexton, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Local Response to, in I ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 479, at 47, 47-48.
481 See Idaho Bureau of Homeland Sec., Regional Response Teams, http://ww.
bhs.idaho.gov/agency/ops.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
482 See Anders Walker, Riots/Demonstrations (Response To), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAw ENFORCEMENT, supra note 479, at 410, 410-11.
483 See Jeff Rojek & David A. Klinger, SWAT Teams, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 479, at 447, 447-48.
484 See Mass. Dep't of Pub. Health, Fact Sheet: Emergency Management and Pub-
lic Health, http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dph/emergency-prep/how-emer-
gencies are-handled.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
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joint effort among state, local, and federal agents, constantly collects
and evaluates intelligence information. 48 5 The Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Health Services has implemented and tested sophisticated
programs for detecting and responding rapidly to bioterrorism and
other public health incidents. 48 6 More than one hundred counties in
Kansas have participated in a "Prairie Plague" bioterrorism drill.48 7 In
Boynton Beach, West Palm Beach, and Palm Beach Counties in Flor-
ida, fire departments have specialized search and rescue teams to go
into collapsed buildings, high-rise towers, and underground tun-
nels.4 8 Montgomery County, Maryland, has special equipment for
hospital surge capacity, mass casualty response, patient identification,
and patient database management for disease investigation. 48 9 The
Arizona Department of Health Services operates a sophisticated labo-
ratory for analyzing biological agents.490 In Illinois, Emergency Medi-
cal Response Teams respond to and assist with emergency medical
ti eatment of mass casualty incidents when activated by the Director of
Public Health; team members assisted victims in Baton Rouge follow-
ing Hurricane Katrina.49 1 The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI), a
partnership with Chicago, St. Louis, and neighboring states, conducts
readiness exercises among large metropolitan areas and states to
enhance cooperation. 49 2  State Weapons of Mass Destruction
(SWMD) Teams are trained to respond to a biological, chemical, or
radiological attack.493 The Chicago Police Department operates a
sophisticated web-based data management system, Community and
485 See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Office of State and Local Gov't, Coordination
and Preparedness, Terrorism Early Warning Group, http://www.mofb.org/web-
quest/terr3.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
486 L.A. COUNTY DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., BIOTERRORISM READINESS REPORT 2
(2005), http://www.labt.org/pdf/BTReadinessReport-2005.pdf.
487 OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., STATE AND LoCAL ACTIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
2 (2002), available atwww.ncs.gov/library/policy-docs/State-andLocalActions-for
HomelandSecurity.pdf.
488 Leon Fooksman, Officials Say Region Is More Secure but Push for Extra Resources, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 9, 2006, at IA.
489 See Gordon Aoyagi, Sept. 11 Reflections and Remembrances; The County's Homeland
Security Director Describes Improvements in Regional Emergency Preparedness, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 2006 (Montgomery Extra), at 10.
490 See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 487, at 11.
491 See Press Release, Ill. Office of Governor Rod. R. Blagojevich, Governor
Blagojevich Names New Deputy Chief of Staff for Public Safety; Carl Hawkinson
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Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR), that assists in ter-
rorist prevention and response measures. 494
Since 9/11, the personnel of local government have largely occu-
pied the "front lines" 495 in the domestic war on terrorism. Police,
firefighters, city transportation officials, public health officers, and
other local employees are the men and women who guard the tunnels
and bridges, monitor ports and harbors, protect transportation sys-
tems, secure public events, test for radiation and biological agents,
and prepare responses in the event of future attacks; they are also the
first responders should an attack occur.49 6 Local governments have
implemented high-tech surveillance, radiation detection systems, and
plans for mass quarantine;497 mayors have sent security delegations to
Israel for training;498 city aircraft patrol the skies and police boats
monitor the harbors; elite city commando teams (called "Hercules
Teams" in New York) stand at the ready;499 and agents of city govern-
ment regularly investigate individuals with possible terrorist ties and
infiltrate suspicious groups.50 0 Measured by its post-9/11 budget and
personnel, the NYPD outranks all but nineteen of the world's standing
armies. 50 1 The Fire Department of New York (FDNY) has over 11,000
494 See ROBERT CHAPMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
RESPONDS TO TERRORISM 5-6 (2002), available at www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/
open.pdPItem=296.
495 HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., A REPORT
FROM THE TASK FORCE ON STATE AND LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY FUNDING 9 (2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC-FundingTaskForceRpt06O4-
FINAL.pdf ("The 'front lines' of our nation's domestic 'War on Terrorism' are in
neighborhoods and communities across the United States where law enforcement,
firefighters, emergency medical technicians, public works and health care workers live
and work.").
496 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program: Helping our Nation's First Responders (Nov. 3, 2003), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/FirstResponderPress.doc; see also The White
House, Facts About First Responders, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/first
responders/0l.htmi (last visited Oct. 29, 2007) (describing local law enforcement
personnel as the "first preventers" of terrorism).
497 See William K. Rashbaum & Judith Miller, New York Police Take Broad Steps in
Facing Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at Al.
498 See A] Baker, Manhattan: Police Receive Antiterrorism Training in Israel, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2002, at B6.
499 See Ed Bradley, Protecting New York, CBS NEWS, Mar. 23, 2003, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/23/60minutes/main545591 .shtml.
500 See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. City Law Dep't, U.S. District Court Grants City's
Request to Modify the Handschu Decree Granting NYPD Much-Needed Latitude in
the Fight Against Terrorism (Feb. 11, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
law/downloads/pdf/pr021103.pdf.
501 See Rashbaum & Miller, supra note 497.
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firefighters and nearly 3000 emergency medical technicians and
paramedics. 50 2 Members of the FDNY receive forty hours of com-
bined HazMat and terrorism awareness training; specialized units
have additional training in responding to chemical and biological
incidents and large-scale -attacks involving weapons of mass destruc-
tion.503 The Department has adopted Internet Protocol-based satel-
lite technology as part of its wireless communications system and has
Inmarsat Global Area Network terminals and services for video, voice,
and data connectivity for response vehicles and the Fire Department
Operations Center and other fixed and mobile command centers.50 4
The New York City Department of Health, with its sophisticated emer-
gency response capabilities, is among the best public health depart-
ments in the world.50 5 Many local government officials also have prior
experience working closely with federal, state, and other local govern-
ments to develop prevention and response measures across regions
and the nation as a whole.
50 6
Emergency commandeering allows the federal government to tap
the vast set of specialized skills and experiences state and local emer-
gency response personnel already possess. Experts warn that military
personnel are not presently capable of responding adequately to
many kinds of emergencies. 50 7 Rather than having to train members
of the military for domestic searches and rescues, evacuations, crowd
502 See FiRE DEP'T CITY OF N.Y., STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2005, at 3 (2004), available at
http://www.nist.gov/public-affairs/ncst/11 22_2004/FDNYStrategicPlan.pdf.
503 See id. at 11-14.
504 Peter J. Brown, Satellites Stand By High Above the Hot Zone, VIA SATELLITE, Aug.
2005, at 30, 30-33.
505 See Rashbaum & Miller, supra note 497.
506 See, e.g., Raymond W. Kelly, Police Comm'r, N.Y. City, Testimony Before the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 3-6, 8 (May 18,
2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearingll/kelly-state-
ment.pdf (describing how New York City has: posted 250 officers full-time to the joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) with the FBI; posted a New York City detective to Wash-
ington to serve as the liaison to the Department of Homeland Security; implemented
an Incident Command System consistent with federal standards; developed a security
alert plan based on the federal Homeland Security Advisory System; and engaged in
cooperation with foreign law enforcement).
507 For example, President Bush has suggested calling in the army and federaliz-
ing the National Guard to deal with an avian flu pandemic. See Brian Knowlton, Bush
Weighs Strategies to Counter Possible Outbreak of Bird Flu, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Oct. 4, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/04/politics/O4cnd-prexy.html (reporting on the
President's suggestion that the military might be needed). However, the armed
forces "have little or no training in combating a pandemic." Tyler Cowen, Avian Flu:
What Should Be Done 28 (Nov. 11, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20060726_Avian-Flu.pdf.
[VOL. 83:1
THE COMMANDEERER IN CHIEF
control, specialized medical procedures, and so on, the federal gov-
ernment can deploy specialists who already have much of the requisite
knowledge base.
V. EMERGENCY AND DEMOCRACY
Emergency commandeering is good for democracy. There are
significant democratic benefits to relying upon state and local person-
nel, rather than professional soldiers, to respond to emergencies.
This Part explores those benefits. It also considers some potential
risks and downsides to emergency commandeering and how they can
be minimized.
A. Democratic Benefits
Properly organized, police and other state and local responders
can successfully respond to many kinds of emergencies without
presenting many of the risks associated with the deployment of
soldiers. Security is an important component of any emergency
response. However, where possible, it is preferable to ask police
rather than soldiers to perform domestic security work. Fundamental
differences between police officers and members of the military make
the former a better choice in many emergency situations. Police
officers are generalist problem solvers who interact on a daily basis
with members of the community. 50 8 Soldiers train for warfare against
enemies and not for dealing with desperate Americans 509-during
Katrina, when soldiers, some fresh from overseas assignments, were
sent to New Orleans, their initial approach was to patrol the city with
weapons raised. 510 The problem extends beyond combat forces.
Police officers have vast experience with crowd control. They know
how to direct the flow of people to prevent dangerous congestion,
how to keep impatient citizens calm, and how to end friction before it
508 In the well-known formulation of Egon Bittner, the police do not engage in
mere law enforcement, but rather use coercive force, or the threat of force, "in accor-
dance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies." EGON BITTNER,
The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Prac-
tices, and Possible Role Models, in ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 89, 131 (1990) (emphasis
omitted).
509 As the House Committee put it: "We cannot expect the Marines to swoop in
with MREs [meals ready to eat] every time a storm hits. We train soldiers to fight
wars. You can't kill a storm." FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 15.
510 See Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (CNN television broadcast Sept. 5, 2005) (tran-
script available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/05/acd.0l.html)
(describing a scene where Lieutenant General Russell Honore repeatedly ordered
troops to put down their weapons).
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gets out of hand. Soldiers by and large do not have experience with
these kinds of measures. Hence, during one Katrina incident,
"soldiers trained in levee repair, not police work, locked themselves
into an exhibit hall at the convention center rather than challenge an
angry and desperate crowd of more than 10,000 hurricane victims.
5 11
While other commentators, also skeptical of regular military forces,
have suggested that a greater role for the National Guard would com-
bine an effective response to emergencies with guarding against exces-
sive federal power,5 12 the National Guard is more akin to the military
than to the police and so it should also be a less preferred choice.
513
Sociologist Hans Geser's work on the differences between police
and military personnel sheds important light on why domestic deploy-
ment of police in emergencies is preferable to relying on military
forces. 514 Police forces, according to Geser, must "react quickly and
adequately to any type of disturbing events occurring at any unpre-
dictable points in space and time."5 15 Accordingly, police depart-
ments are characterized by "bottom-up organization," with the lowest
level individual police officer responsible for many on-the-spot deci-
sions: "scanning the environment, taking notice of relevant events,
deciding immediately on the spot whether and in what way interven-
tion shall occur, and whether it is necessary to mobilize higher levels
of the organization. '5 1 6 As a result, the overall quality of police work
depends on the "capabilities of lower level policemen: on their moral
integrity, sound judgment and personal authority as well as on various
professional skills."517 In addition, successful police work "relies heav-
ily on cooperative relationships with many civilian citizens and institu-
tions."518 By contrast, "the major concern of armies is to focus huge
amounts of resources for decisive violent actions against enemy forces
511 Shane & Shanker, supra note 438.
512 See, e.g., Oates, supra note 132, at 166 ("Activation of National Guard mem-
bers . . reinforces the emergency powers of the governor that are established in the
U.S. Constitution and encourages strong state or territorial role in an emergency
disaster.").
513 Though the distinctions are not perfectly crisp-some members of the
National Guard are police or firefighters in civilian life.
514 See Hans Geser, International Policing: A New Evolutionary Stage of Military
Organization? Peace-keeping Missions in a Sociological Perspective (May 14, 1996),
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or other clearly defined targets." 5 19 Accordingly, a military force is a
"top-down organization": a successful military strike requires "strategic
and operational planning, well-coordinated supply systems and highly
elaborated systems of centralized leadership and hierarchical con-
trols." 520 These basic differences in organization and operation point
to the mismatch that can easily occur when military personnel, rather
than police officers, are deployed to respond to domestic emergen-
cies. Emergencies, by definition, produce heterogeneous demands.
Emergencies require respondents to perform a variety of tasks
depending on the circumstances and their evolution; responders first
on the scene must be able to make individualized judgments about
what is required of them and how best to proceed. Soldiers are likely
less suited to balancing the various demands domestic emergencies
produce. 521
Police and other state and local emergency response personnel
are also accountable to civilian government in ways that might not be
true, or easily made true, of military forces. 522 Mayors and the city
council members who supervise urban police are elected officials, as
are sheriffs. Civilian complaint boards allow individuals to file com-
plaints about police misconduct. Police departments operate under
close regulation by the courts. In particular, since the Warren Court
era, courts have crafted detailed rules based on the Federal Bill of
Rights that govern police officers' interactions with citizens. Military
personnel are not likely to be naturally predisposed to observe these




522 See Julianne Smith & Derek Chollet, The Return of U.S. Mission Creep, DEF.
NEWS, Oct. 10, 2005, at 21, available at http://www.defensenews.com/
story.php?F=1164780 (criticizing proposals to use the military in disaster relief as
"dangerous" because they allow the military to "outrank its civilian chain of command
in influence, authority and resources").
523 There are numerous examples of domestic deployment of soldiers resulting in
excesses. For example, when the army was deployed in response to the 1899 miners'
strike in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, soldiers conducted door-to-door searches and
arrested and detained people in large numbers without probable cause. See Note,
Riot Control & the Use of Federal Troops, 81 HARV. L. REV. 638, 642 & nn.33-34 (1968).
Military forces, in the guise of restoring law and order, suppressed lawful union activi-
ties during World War I. See, e.g., Jerry M. Cooper, Federal Military Intervention in
Domestic Disorders, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 120, 136-38 (Richard H. Kohn ed. 1991). Of course,
there are also examples of the police using excessive force: for example, the fre-
quently heavy-handed responses to protests in the 1960s, see, e.g., Emmanuel 0.
Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and the March Toward Color-
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over to professional soldiers raises basic issues about whether their
activities would be subject to adequate constraints and whether courts
would have the inclination or resources to supervise how military per-
sonnel conduct searches, seize citizens, question suspects, and other-
wise use force. This is not to say that all or any of the present-day
checks on police behavior would necessarily apply when police (and
other state and local personnel) are called into federal service and
dispatched to the site of an emergency. Whether constitutional pro-
tections would operate in the same way, whether there would be liabil-
ity for police misconduct during these periods, whether individual
officers or the federal or state government could be sued: all are issues
that would require future consideration by Congress and the courts.
My point is simply that police officers come from a strong tradition of
operating within a framework of clearly defined rights, limitations on
permissible conduct, and oversight mechanisms. The same is not
likely to be true of military personnel who, though subject to a chain
of internal command, do not typically experience control from courts
or other outside entities. Soldiers, as a saying goes, are trained to
vaporize, not to Mirandize.524
In addition to a tradition of formal civilian supervision, police
departments tend to be embedded within broader communities that
also shape and constrain police behavior. The military distinguishes
itself from the general population (soldiers live in barracks) and
emphasizes inter-unit cohesiveness. Police forces, by contrast, develop
and maintain relationships with members of their communities.
Notions of community policing emphasize that police work is most
successful when it is conducted in coordination with members of the
local community, with officers understanding themselves to be mem-
bers of the communities they serve rather than outsiders imposing
external rules. More generally, as theories of democratic policing
stress, law enforcement activities can be made to reflect broader dem-
Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REv. 1, 21 n.134 (2001); the beating
of Rodney King by members of the LAPD in March 1991; seePAUL CHEVIC.NY, EDGE OF
THE KNIFE 42-45 (1995); and the shooting of Amadou Diallo by NYPD officers in
February 1999, see, e.g., Christopher Dunn, Balancing the Right to Protest in the Aftermath
of September 11, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 327, 335 (2005). See generally CHEVIGNY,
supra, at 35, 55-57 (depicting the decline of the admiration and professionalism of
the LAPD as a result of the use of excessive force and police brutality). There is also a
risk of excess when nonmilitary agents carry out military-style raids, as suggested by
the Waco raid by ATF agents in February 1993. See David A. Koplow, Tangled Up in
Khaki & Blue: Lethal & Non-Lethal Weapons in Recent Confrontations, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L.
703, 754-69 (2005).
524 Mathew Miller, Wheres the Beef?, TIME, Mar. 1996, at 37, 38 (citing the state-
ment of Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan).
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ocratic norms. 525 Military personnel do not typically have these same
kinds of experiences or motivations.
Beyond external checks on their behavior, there is some reason
to think that compared to soldiers, police officers have greater inter-
nal motivation and capacity to act in ways that are consistent with
democratic norms. Police officers are generally accustomed to mak-
ing judgment calls. They are therefore more likely to refuse orders to
engage in abusive practices than are soldiers who are trained to follow
orders-to shoot first and ask questions later. On this score, it is sig-
nificant that police departments increasingly represent a cross-section
of the population. Police forces are increasingly diverse;5 26 there is at
least some evidence that police officers from minority backgrounds
have greater understanding of and credibility within minority commu-
nities. 52 7 The diversification of police departments has also produced
organizations of minority police officers, like the National Organiza-
tion of Black Law Enforcement Officers, that monitor and exert influ-
ence on departmental policies and practices. 528 Just as the old militia,
comprised of regular citizens, embodied and therefore protected the
people's liberties, so too modem police departments can represent
the interests of the population as a whole.
B. Risks and Downsides
Though preferable to other options, emergency commandeering
is not a perfect solution to the problems federalism presents in times
of emergency. Emergency commandeering might not naturally pro-
vide the most efficient response to emergencies. Police officers,
firefighters, and other personnel from disparate jurisdictions might
not be able to work together seamlessly. At the very least, they will
need a common core of training so that when brought together they
have common skills and practices. Like any other emergency
response plan, a key component of the success of emergency com-
mandeering will be adequate advanced planning and training. Emer-
525 See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. Rrv. 1699, 1700-02
(2005) (discussing various conceptions of democratic policing).
526 See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the
New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1210 (2006)
("The virtually all-white, virtually all-male [police] departments of the 1950s and
1960s have given way to departments with large numbers of female and minority
officers, often led by female or minority chiefs. Openly gay and lesbian officers, too,
are increasingly commonplace.").
527 See id. at 1224-28 (discussing mixed evidence about how minority officers per-
form in minority communities).
528 See id. at 1230-31.
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gency commandeering might burden states and localities from which
personnel are drawn. PartiCularly well-trained and highly skilled
response personnel might find themselves frequently called into fed-
eral service. This will produce perverse incentives for localities consid-
ering how much to invest in preparing their employees for
emergencies as well as raise basic problems of fairness. The possibility
of being called with any regularity into federal service and deployed to
a far-off location for dangerous work might also lead some emergency
response workers to find different employment and produce local
problems of recruitment. 529 In crafting an emergency comman-
deering statute, Congress must ensure that burdens are distributed
evenly among states and localities.
It would also be wrong to assume that the democratic benefits of
emergency commandeering will develop and thrive without any kind
of attention or cultivation. Police and other state and local emer-
gency response personnel might not automatically carry with them
the same set of democratic values when enlisted into federal service
and deployed to an emergency outside of their own communities. It
is not hard to imagine, for example, a police officer whose regularjob
is to patrol a Philadelphia neighborhood, and who knows and
depends on members of that local community, having a different dis-
position when sent under federal command to New Orleans in the
aftermath of a hurricane. 530 Training programs and other efforts will
likely be required to capture and maximize emergency comman-
deering's democratic advantages.
CONCLUSION
The emergency commandeering option I have presented in this
Article can resolve the widely recognized difficulties federalism
presents in times of emergency. In contrast to other proposals for the
federal government in times of emergency to bypass state and local
governments and send in military forces, my proposal leaves the
response in the hands of civilian workers. Rather than centralize
entirely the response function, my proposal allows for the necessary
federal command, while preserving the roles of state and local govern-
529 However, the attrition rate for police departments is low. SeeJustin McCrary,
The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the Composition and Quality of Police, 97 Am.
ECON. REV. 318, 323 (2007) (reporting an attrition rate of 3.6%).
530 On the other hand, physical attachment is not everything, as police officers
today do not typically live in the same communities they police; even "a police depart-
ment engaged in community policing remains . . . 'a force of outsiders."' Sklansky,
supra note 525, at 1798 (quoting Gerald Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 81
(1998)).
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ments. Emergency commandeering best reflects the tradition of
American federalism and democracy. It is consistent with the provi-
sions in the Constitution for responding to emergencies and with his-
torical practices.
The proposal offered here does not preclude entirely any use of
the military to respond to an emergency. Some emergencies will
undoubtedly require the deployment of soldiers to maintain order.
The detonation of a nuclear device in an American city, for instance,
would almost certainly require the use of military forces-to maintain
a quarantine zone, deliver supplies to survivors, and control the ensu-
ing panic. However, an emergency for which commandeering of state
and local personnel is an inadequate response will be the exception.
In most emergencies, deploying state and local responders under fed-
eral command will be as good as or better than deploying military
forces. Given the choice between local militia units and professional
soldiers, our predecessors always chose the militia. We should make
an analogous choice and, in times of emergency, opt for federal com-
mandeering of state and local responders over the domestic deploy-
ment of military forces.
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